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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Econometrics
and its Application to Education
by
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Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
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Professor Rosa Liliana Matzkin, Co-Chair
Professor Kathleen M McGarry, Co-Chair
This dissertation consists of three chapters that study econometrics questions and their ap-
plications to education. Chapter 1 studies a nonparametric two-sided many-to-one matching 
model, where many agents on one side match one institution on the other side. Classical 
examples include student-college matching and firm-worker matching. In this paper, I study 
nonparametric identification and estimation of many-to-one matching with non-transferable 
utility. The existing literature either assumes that the matching algorithm and reported 
preferences are observed or that preferences are homogeneous. This paper assumes hetero-
geneous preferences on the two sides and only requires data on who matches with whom 
in a single large market. Under mild restrictions, I prove that both the utility functions of 
the students and colleges and the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity from the 
two sides are nonparametrically identified. Based on my constructive identification results, 
I propose nonparametric and semiparametric estimators of the model and establish their 
consistency and asymptotic normality. The semiparametric estimator converges at a root-n 
rate.
ii
Chapter 2 analyzes the U.S. college admissions under a many-to-one matching framework.
In recovering the parameters of the utility functions, I am able to demonstrate substantial
welfare consequences for different groups of students, relative to a centralized matching
mechanism. In estimating the model using data from High School Longitudinal Study of
2009 (HSLS:09) and the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), I show
that the students who experience the largest losses are first-generation college students and
low-ability students. This potential loss among these groups provides an opportunity for
policy interventions to lead to substantial gains in welfare.
Chapter 3 (joint with Kathleen McGarry) studies the three generations of changing gender
patterns of schooling in China. The phenomenon of son preference in China and throughout
much of Asia has been well documented. However, changing economic conditions, such as
increases in educational attainment and employment opportunities for women and the rise
in the prevalence of one child families, have likely changed the incentives for parents to
invest in daughters. In this paper, we take advantage of data spanning three generations
of Chinese families to examine the evolution of educational attainment for boys and girls
and importantly the relative levels of schooling of each gender. We also use variation in the
timing of compulsory schooling laws and the implementation of the one child policy to assess
the effect of these policy measures on the relative educational levels. We find a substantial
narrowing of the gap between the schooling of boys and girls, so much so that girls now have
more schooling on average than boys. In addition, public policy initiatives had a larger effect
in rural than urban areas.
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Chapter 1
Identification and Estimation of
Many-to-One Matching
1
1.1 Introduction
Two-sided many-to-one matching models study the assignment of many agents to one in-
stitution. They have broad applications in the real world — for example, in the college
admissions, each college matches many students, in the labor market, each firm matches
many workers. While the theoretical properties of matching models have been extensively
discussed and well established, the econometric framework for recovering preferences in these
markets is less well explored. The primary goal of this paper is to identify and estimate pref-
erences in a many-to-one matching market. This includes recovering how students’ and
colleges’ characteristics determine their preferences and how the unobserved heterogeneity
is distributed. The model only requires data on matching outcomes (i.e., who matches with
whom) in a single large market. Such a model is useful when the mechanism that assigns
agents to institutions is not observed. I use the college admissions problem to illustrate my
methodology and to demonstrate the importance of estimating preferences in a real world
setting. 1
Recovering preferences in a many-to-one matching model allows one to analyze the equi-
librium outcome, evaluate the impact of alternative public policies, and quantify welfare
implications of different allocation mechanisms. Specifically, this paper provides insights
into the following aspects. First, the equilibrium outcome depends on the preferences of the
two sides (i.e., the students and the colleges). It is thus necessary and difficult to identify
the underlying preferences. Second, public policies that are designed for a particular subset
of students or colleges may have equilibrium effects on all players. Third, the outcome of
the matching mechanisms per se has welfare and inequality implications, many of which,
including the welfare consequences of decentralized markets, are still not well understood.2
1The college admissions problem was introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962). Many matching problems
fit in this model where the participants on one side of the market are individuals (e.g., students, workers,
and interns) and the participants on the other side are institutions (e.g., colleges, firms, and hospitals).
2Examples of decentralized matching markets include college admissions in countries such as the U.S.,
UK, Japan and Korea, taxi market, some annual entry-level professional labor markets such as the market for
new PhD economists, and so on. These markets are in contrast to centralized markets in which participants
of each side submit preference rank order lists or priority rules and receive allocations from a centralized
2
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on the identification and estimation of
matching models. Without parametrically specifying either the utility functions of students
or colleges, or the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity of the two sides, I prove
that the utility functions and the joint distribution of the unobserved terms in a many-to-one
matching model are identified under mild restrictions. Following the constructive identifica-
tion results, I propose estimation methods for both the nonparametric and semiparametric
models. I establish the consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimator in each case.
Especially, the semiparametric estimator is root-n consistent, asymptotically normal, and
easy to apply. I then exploit the proposed estimator to analyze the U.S. college admis-
sions, quantify the welfare consequences of the decentralized market relative to a centralized
benchmark, and investigate channels through which the welfare can be improved.
I focus on matchings with non-transferable utility.3 In this model, each student faces a
multinomial choice set that is unobserved and determined in equilibrium. The choice sets in
equilibrium essentially depend on the preferences of all colleges and students in the market;
in particular, unobserved taste shocks of each student will influence her own choice set
through the equilibrium. To facilitate a tractable structure, I build on the theoretical model
of Azevedo and Leshno (2016), who establish a cutoff-theoretic framework for matching
markets. The cutoff for any particular is defined as the minimal utility obtained from the
students with whom the college is matched. Azevedo and Leshno (2016) prove that there
is a one-to-one correspondence between stable matchings and market clearing cutoffs. The
cutoffs, while still unobserved and endogenous in my model, serve as sufficient statistics for
the characterization of the choice sets. I then use equilibrium cutoffs in the limit, where
the number of students goes to infinity while the number of colleges remains fixed, as an
approximation for the equilibrium cutoffs in the finite models.
clearing house. National Resident Matching Programs (NRMP) and school assignment system in New York
and Boston adopt a centralized mechanism.
3In non-transferable utility model, there is no transfers that are negotiated by each student-college pair
and endogenously determined to clear the market. For example, in school choice problem, although students
pay tuition fees to schools or colleges, these monetary transfers are not determined by each matched pairs.
3
To identify the model, I use a set of exclusive regressors, each of which affects the prefer-
ence of only one college without shifting the preference of students, to trace out the variation
in the choice sets. Furthermore, because the joint distribution of students’ and colleges’ un-
observed heterogeneity is not parametrically specified, I separate the underlying utilities
from the two sides by introducing an additional set of exclusive regressors that alter only
the student’s preferences without changing her choice set.
The identification results consist of two parts. First, I show the identification of the
derivatives of the utility functions of students and colleges. The formal proof builds on
Matzkin (2018), who establishes pointwise constructive identification in a fully nonparamet-
ric discrete choice model with nonseparable errors. In Matzkin (2018), by taking derivatives
of the probability of choosing an alternative outside the set, the nonparametric problem
is transformed into a system of linear equations. The solution to the system of equations
recovers the derivatives of the utility functions. This paper follows similar strategies on a
two-sided matching model and uses the derivatives from conditional probabilities of being
matched with each college. It is an extension of Matzkin (2018) by considering a discrete
choice model with unobserved choice sets. Moreover, although the probability of being un-
matched is sufficient for the identification, I consider the probability of being matched to
each college. This setting of relatively richer information enables me to propose a root-n
consistent semiparametric estimator based on the constructive identification results.
The second part of the identification results involves the joint distribution of the un-
observed random terms. In classic discrete choice models, once the utility functions are
identified, the distribution of the unobserved random term can be directly identified from
the conditional probability of choosing the outside option. However, in a two-sided matching
model, disentangling the effects of taste shocks from the two sides is challenging, especially
given that the random terms from the two sides and across colleges can be correlated. The
key insight here is that the outcome where a student is not matched with any college can arise
for several reasons based on differences in abilities and preferences. For example, the student
4
does not want to attend any college and is not qualified for any college. Or, the student is
qualified for but unwilling to go to any college (possibly due to liquidity constraints). The
probability of the latter scenario can be identified by “shutting down” the effects of students’
qualification. The probability of the former scenario corresponds to the joint distribution of
the random terms. It is identified once the probabilities of all the other scenarios such as
the latter scenario are identified.
Directly following the identification results, I propose a nonparametric estimator for my
model based on Kernel methods and establish its consistency and asymptotic normality. In
a semiparametric model, based on my nonparametric identification results, I construct a
set of moment conditions, where the elements other than the parameters of interest can be
estimated using average derivative estimators. I thus propose a two-step estimator where
the first step implements the average derivative estimation and the second step implements
GMM estimation. I then show the root-n consistency and asymptotic normality of the
semiparametric estimator.
Contributions to the Literature
This paper contributes to various strands of literature. First, this paper contributes to the
literature on the identification of matching models by allowing richer heterogeneity and by
separately and nonparametrically identifying utility functions from the two sides. There is an
extensive literature on matching models with transferable utility (TU) (Choo and Siow, 2006;
Graham, 2013; Sinha, 2015; Chiappori and Salanié, 2016; Mindruta, Moeen, and Agarwal,
2016; Fox, 2010, 2018; Fox, Yang, and Hsu, 2018, among others). Instead, this paper focuses
on the small literature on matching models with nontransferable utility (NTU). While TU
model is more straightforward to characterize due to the equivalence between stability and
surplus maximization and the existence of unique equilibrium, it cannot separately identify
utility functions from the two sides when the transfers are not observed.4 Menzel (2015)
4The reason is that in a TU model, only quasi-surplus (i.e., the sum of the utilities of the matched pair)
matters for the equilibrium.
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establishes a simple asymptotic formula of one-to-one matching with NTU, but the model
also cannot separately identify the utility functions. In contrast, in my paper, the utility
functions from the two sides are separately identified, which is crucial when, for example,
one is interested in the welfare of students and colleges separately. The other two papers on
NTU that I am aware of allowing separate identification of the utility functions are Diamond
and Agarwal (2017) and Galichon and Hsieh (2018). Diamond and Agarwal (2017) study
a positive assortative matching model incorporating both TU and NTU in a nonparametric
framework. The asymptotics they consider are that the number of agents on both sides
goes to large. They assume that preferences are homogeneous and the attractiveness can be
summarized using a single index. In comparison, my paper assumes that only the number
of students goes to large and allows for fully heterogeneous preferences on the two sides.
Galichon and Hsieh (2018) derive a Leontief matching function, which may be identified
using multi-market data. By contrast, my paper considers one large market.
This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to prove nonparametric identification
of the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in an NTU matching model.5 Moreover,
it allows correlation in preferences for different alternatives. Such flexibility is important
because, in practice, there may be unobserved characteristics of the student that make the
colleges (or the student) to exhibit correlated preferences over the student (the colleges).
By developing a framework that does not require information on matching mechanism
or preference rank order lists of either students or colleges, I extend the literature on school
choice using the matching framework. A few recently emerging literature on school choice
(Fack, Grenet, and He, 2019; Agarwal and Somaini, 2018; Bucarey, 2018) follows and extends
the cutoff-framework, assuming that the cutoffs are observed. This paper departs from the
literature by assuming that the cutoffs are unobserved, which is the case in the U.S. college
admissions and many labor markets.
5Regarding the TU model, Fox, Yang, and Hsu (2018) nonparametrically identify the distribution of
unobserved Heterogeneity. They consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades using data
from many markets.
6
My paper also relates to the growing literature on consideration set (Eliaz and Spiegler,
2011a,b; Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay, 2012; Manzini and Mariotti, 2014, among oth-
ers). In such models, agents choose the utility-maximizing alternative from a consideration
set which is limited to the alternatives to which they pay attention. My model shares similar
structure with these studies in the sense that agents face a choice set with some alternatives
eliminated. The difference is that the limited choice set is due to the bilateral feature of a
matching model (i.e., students can only choose from the colleges that admit them) rather
than to limited attention. Moreover, the limited choice set in my model is determined in
the equilibrium. Also, similar to these studies, my model goes beyond the Independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption.
1.2 The Model
In this section, I study a two-sided many-to-one matching model with complete information.
The students are indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and colleges indexed by j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Each
college j’s capacity relative to n is denoted by sj ∈ S = (0, 1), which is exogenously given
and observed. Assume that the total number of available seats does not exceed the total
number of students in the market, i.e., ∑
j
sj < 1.
1.2.1 Utility
I consider a matching model with non-transferable utilities (NTU) in a single market. The
preferences are represented by random utility functions of the form,
uij = uj(xi, zij, ij) (1.1)
vji = vj(zij, xi, ηji), (1.2)
7
where uij denotes student i’s preference for college j and vji denotes college j’s preference
for student i. Both uij and vji depend on student i’s observed attribute xi ∈ Rkx and
college j’s observed attributes zij ∈ Rkz . xi can include, for example, family background
and SAT score. zij can refer to net price of attending college, which is defined as tuition
minus student’s scholarships or grant. The scalars ij and ηji are unobserved match-specific
taste shocks that enter uij and vji, respectively.6 The random terms therefore allow for
heterogeneity in taste shocks over an infinite number of observed types. I emphasize that I do
not impose any parametric assumptions on the joint distribution of (i1, . . . , iJ , η1i, . . . , ηJi)
for the identification results. The taste shocks are i.i.d. across i, and for each student i, I
allow the unobserved random terms to be correlated among colleges. This implies that the
unobservables can nest individual-specific taste shocks.
Furthermore, assume all students are acceptable, i.e., colleges always prefer being matched
to some student over keeping seats unfilled. However, students may prefer choosing some
outside options over going to colleges.
1.2.2 Equilibrium
Let mij denote whether student i is matched with college j. That is, mij = 1 if student
i is matched with college j and mij = 0 otherwise. A matching can be represented by
m = {mij}i=1,...,n, j=1,...,J . The solution concept is pairwise stability.7
Definition 1. A student-college pair (i, j) blocks a matching m if student i prefers college
j to his current match and either (i) college j still has vacant seats or (ii) there exists another
student k matched with college j whose is ranked by college j below student i.
Definition 2. A matching m is pairwise stable if it is not blocked by any student-college
6The assumption of match-specific unobservables is in line with Menzel (2015) and Fox, Yang, and Hsu
(2018). In contrast, Choo and Siow (2006), Fox (2010, 2018), Galichon and Salanie (2015), Sinha (2015),
Galichon and Salanie (2015), and Galichon and Hsieh (2018) assume type-specific unobservables in the sense
that men have identical preference for women in the same observed type.
7By definition, pairwise stable matchings are robust to one-link deviations. It is a weak equilibrium
notation that is very commonly used in a matching context.
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pair.
Given a stable matching m, define the associated cutoff of college j by the lowest utility
it obtains from the students matched with it:
pj = inf{i:mij=1}
vji.
Let p = (p1, . . . , pJ)
′ . There is a one-to-one correspondence between stable matchings and
market clearing cutoffs (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016). I thus can summarize a stable matching
using a J × 1 vector p. Throughout the paper, I assume that p is unobserved.
We observe matching outcome m, college’s capacities (s1, . . . , sJ), and i.i.d. data on
characteristics of students and colleges {xi, zij}ni=1. Let i and ηi denote the vectors of unob-
served random shocks of student i’s preferences over colleges and colleges’ preferences over
student i, respectively, i.e.,i = (i1, . . . , iJ)
′
, ηi = (η1i, . . . , ηJi)
′ . Let zi = (z
′
i1, . . . , z
′
iJ)
′and
zi,−j = (z
′
i1, . . . , zij−1, zij+1, . . . , z
′
iJ)
′ . For a given vector p, the choice set of student i can be
written as
C(xi, zi, ηi; p) = {j : pj ≤ vj(zij, xi, ηji)},
Given the choice set, student i make the decision of whether to be matched with college
j as a “price-taker”
mij(xi, i, ηi, zij; zi,−j, p)
=1
(
j = arg max
{j′∈Ch(xi,zi,ηi;p)}
uj
′
(xi, zj′ , ij′ )
)
= 1(j ∈ C(xi, zi, ηi; p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Admitted by college j
× ∏
j
′ 6=j
[
1− 1
(
uj(xi, zij, ij) < uj
′
(xi, zij′ , ij′ )
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
college j′college j
1(j ′ ∈ C(xi, zi, ηi; p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Admitted by college j′
]
9
The above expression implies that student i is matched with college j if and only if (i)
college j is available to student i, and (ii) there does not exist any other college j ′ who
forms a blocking pair with student i (i.e., there does not exist any other college j ′ that is
feasible to student i and will give student i higher utility than college j). Given the cutoff,
the “decision” of being matched with college j depends on all the colleges’ characteristics
(zi1, . . . , ziJ) in addition to student i’s own characteristics (xi, ηi, i).
Let xn = (x′1, . . . , x
′
n)
′ , znj = (z
′
1j, . . . , z
′
nj)
′ , zn−j = (z
′
1,−j, . . . , z
′
n,−j)
′ , zn = (znj , zn−j),
n = (′1, . . . , 
′
n)
′ , and ηn = (η′1, . . . , η
′
n). Define the demand for college j as the fraction of
students who would be assigned to college j, that is,
Dn,j(xn, znj , n, ηn; zn−j, p) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
mij(xi, i, ηi, zij; zi,−j, p).
I can then pin down the J × 1 vector of equilibrium cutoffs pn via the following J × 1
equilibrium conditions, for each college j ∈ {1, . . . , J},
Dn,j(xn, znj , n, ηn; zn−j, pn) = sj. (1.3)
The equilibrium cutoffs pn(xn, n, ηn, zn, s) equates the supply and demand of the col-
leges and thus depend on all the characteristics of all the participants in the market. The
endogeneity problem arises because students’ taste shocks would influence their own choice
set through equilibrium. This motives us to focus on large market where such correlation
vanishes as n goes to infinity. Furthermore, the large market helps tackle the multiplicity
of equilibria. There are generally multiple equilibria in small or finite markets but they
converge to a unique equilibrium when the market size goes to large (Azevedo and Leshno,
2016).
10
1.3 Uniqueness and Convergence of Equilibrium
In this section, I discuss the properties of stable matchings in a limit continuum model. Three
features make the limit approximation a convenient tool for identification and estimation.
First, in the limit model, the equilibrium is deterministic as it depends on the distribution of
the characteristics rather than the values of the characteristics of all the students and colleges.
Second, a unique equilibrium exists in the limit model (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016). Third,
the equilibria in the finite market converge to the equilibrium in the limit market (Azevedo
and Leshno, 2016).
When n→∞, for any given p, the limiting demand function of college j can be written
as
Dj(p) = E[mij(xi, i, ηi, zij; zi,−j, p)],
where the expectation is taken with respect to (xi, zi, i, ηi). The vector of equilibrium cutoffs
p∗ is determined by the continuum analogue of Equations (1.3):
Dj(p) = sj. (1.4)
In the limiting economy, p∗ only depends on the distribution of student’s characteristics
rather than the collection of all the individual students’ characteristics.
1.3.1 Uniqueness
To establish the uniqueness of the limiting equilibrium, I impose assumptions on the joint
distribution of unobserved error terms and on colleges’ utility functions.
Assumption 1.
(i) (i, ηi) are i.i.d. across i with CDF F , which is continuously differentiable.
(ii) vj(·) is continuously differentiable in its last argument.
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Assumption 1(i) requires independence across students. However, it is still quite flexible
since it allow correlation between i and ηi among colleges. The smoothness restrictions
imposed in Assumption 1(i)(ii) guarantee that colleges have continuous preference.
Lemma 1. (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016) Under Assumption 1, the limiting economy has a
unique vector of equilibrium cutoff p∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
1.3.2 Convergence
Since the existence and uniqueness of a stable matching are well established in a continuum
model, it is convenient to exploit the continuum economy as a tool to study large finite
economies. The question is whether the stable matchings in large finite economies are well
approximated by the stable matching in the continuum economy. Proposition 1 answers this
question by showing that the set of equilibrium cutoffs in finite markets converge to the
unique limit equilibrium cutoff in the Hausdorff distance as n goes to infinity.
Proposition 1. (Azevedo and Leshno, 2016) Let Pn denote the set of equilibrium cutoffs of
finite economy of size n. Under Assumptions 1 , given any s, as n→∞,
sup
pn∈Pn
||pn(xn, zn, n, ηn)− p∗|| p→ 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
The basic idea of the proof is first to show that for any given, the demand function Dn(p)
in the finite economy converges in probability to D(p) in the continuum economy by uniform
law of large numbers. Then, under the continuity of the limit demand function D(p), which
is implied by Assumption 1, the equilibrium cutoffs that equating demand and supply in the
finite economy must be close enough to that in the limit economy.
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1.4 Nonparametric Identification
Given the convergence result in the previous section, for the rest of the paper, I analyze the
identification and estimation of the limiting model. The model is a discrete choice model
with unobserved and heterogeneous choice sets that depend on equilibrium. Although the
identification of discrete choice models has been well established (McFadden, 1973, 1981;
Manski, 1975, 1985; Cosslett, 1983; Horowitz, 1992; Ichimura, 1993; Klein and Spady, 1993;
Lewbel, 2000; Berry and Haile, 2009; Chiappori and Komunjer, 2009; Briesch, Chintagunta,
and Matzkin, 2010; Matzkin, 1991, 1992, 1993, 2007, 2012, 2018, among others), the identi-
fication of my model is challenging because matching markets are bilateral, in the sense that
in order to be enrolled in a college, the student has to be admitted by this college; so the
equilibrium outcome is determined by the two sides’ preferences.
In this section, I discuss the nonparametric identification of the derivatives of the utility
function as well as the joint distribution of the unobserved random terms. My identification
analysis relies on exclusive regressors on both sides of the market, denoted by (yi1, . . . , yiJ)
and (wi1, . . . , wiJ), respectively. yij only affects student i’s preference over college j without
influencing student i’s choice set or altering her preferences over colleges other than j.8
Similarly, wij is used to capture the likelihood that college j shows up in the choice set
without changing student’s preferences. Here, I consider a separable model with additive
exclusive regressors. Specifically, for j = 1, . . . , J , the utility functions are given as
uij = uj(xi, zij) + yij + ij
vji = vj(zij, xi) + wij + ηji.
For each j, utility functions of both sides are separable into an index of the form ij + yij
8A commonly used exclusive regressor yij in the literature (e.g., Agarwal, 2015) is the distance between
student i and college j. The exclusive regressor on the other side, wij , for example, could be the decompo-
sition of the admission committee, which will not affect student’s preference since it is usually unobserved
by students; or it could be the matching degree between worker’s skill set and the firm’s type.
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and ηji + wij, respectively. The coefficients of yij and wij are normalized to 1. Given that I
do not impose any parametric assumption on the joint distribution of the unobserved terms,
this is just a necessary scale normalization of utilities. I normalize the utility of not going
to college to zero.9 Separability is not necessary for the identification results; however, I
focus on this specification to simplify the expressions and to illustrate the main idea. It’s
easy to extend this model to a more general nonseparable model based on Matzkin (2018)
given that value of the outside option is observed, which is not needed in the current setting.
Specifically, the utility functions and the joint CDF of the unobservables are also identified
in the following nonseparable setting: for j = 1, the utility functions are given as
ui1 = u1(xi, zi1, i1 + yi1)
v1i = v1(zi1, xi, η1i + wi1);
for j = 2, . . . , J , the utility functions are given as
uij = uj(xi, zij, yij, ij)
vji = vj(zij, xi, wij, ηji).
1.4.1 Identifying the Derivative of the Utility Function
First consider identifying the derivatives of the utility functions. Assume that I observe the
conditional probability of being matched to college j for all j = 1, . . . , J . 10
9My identification results in this subsection does not depend on the specific constant value assigned to
the outside option because they rely on the derivatives of the conditional probabilities.
10The idea also applies if one only observes one college’s conditional matched probability or the conditional
probability of being unmatched. Given all the colleges’ conditional probabilities and sufficient variations in
the derivatives of the conditional probabilities, the model is overidentified. In this section, I use the minimal
and necessary conditions for identification. I will revisit the overidentification problem when discussing
semiparametric estimation of the model.
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Overview and Intuition
To illustrate the identification strategy, consider the special case of J = 2 colleges indexed by
j ∈ {1, 2}. Here, for this simplified case, I illustrate how the exclusive regressors are used to
facilitate the identification by tracing out the variation in the choice sets. Assume that the
utility functions of college 1 and college 2 are v1 = v1(x) +w1 + η1 and v2 = v2(x) +w2 + η2,
respectively. Assume that the (unobserved) cutoffs of college 1 and college 2 are p1 and p2,
respectively. In Figure 1.1, I show the choice set of students in this game. Panel (A) shows
that for any value of (x,w1, w2), student’s choice set partitions R2 into four parts depending
on whether a student would choose from both colleges, only college 1, only college 2, or no
college. A student would be admitted by college 1 if η1 > p1 − v1(x)− w1 and be admitted
by college 2 if η2 > p2 − v2(x)− w2.
Panel (B) shows how distinct values of w1 would lead to different choice sets, holding
(x,w2) fixed. Since w1 determines the preference of college 1 over the student, the increase
from w1 to w¯1 makes college 1 more feasible. The areas C1 and C2 highlight the sets of
students whose choice sets differ given these two different values of w1. Since w1 only enters
v1 and moves in the same way as η1, the variation in w1 will trace out the variation in
η1, without having to observe p1. To see how the predicted conditional probabilities would
change as the choice sets change, without loss of generality, assume that college 1  college
2 for all the students. Then the change in the conditional probability of being unmatched
would depend on the mass that the density of (η1, η2) puts on the area C1. Similarly, the
change in the conditional probability of being matched with college 2 would depend on the
mass that the density of (η1, η2) puts on the area C2. One can draw a similar graph for w2,
the change of which would move the partition along the vertical axis.
Panel (C) depicts the change in the choice sets induced by shifting x. Since x enters the
utilities of both colleges, v1 and v2, the change in it moves the partition along both axes.
Different from w1 and w2, the way that x moves the partition depends on the shape of the
functions, v1(·) and v2(·). Areas C3 to C7 show the sets of students who face different choice
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p1 − v1(x)− w1
p2 − v2(x)− w2
∅
{College 1, College 2}{College 2}
{College 1}
η1
η2
(a) Choice set given (x,w1, w2)
p1 − v1(x)− w1p1 − v1(x)− w¯1
p2 − v2(x)− w2
∅
{College 1, College 2}{College 2}
{College 1}
η1
η2
C1
C2
(b) Change in choice set induced by w1
p1 − v1(x)− w1p1 − v1(x¯)− w1
p2 − v2(x)− w2
p2 − v2(x¯)− w2
∅
{College 1, College 2}{College 2}
{College 1}
η1
η2
C5
C4
C3
C6C7
(c) Change in choice set induced by x
Figure 1.1: Choice Set Partitions
sets under the two distinct values of x. Similar to panel (B), one can connect the change in
the predicted conditional probabilities with the change in the partitions by considering the
preferences of students and the mass placed on each set.
The identification results, as will be formally shown below, illustrate the trade off between
the changes caused by the variables. In this simplified case, for j = 0, 1, 2, the conditional
probability of choosing the option j satisfy the following equation
∂P (mj|x,w1, w2)
∂x
= ∂v
1
∂x
∂P (mj|x,w1, w2)
∂w1
+ ∂v
2
∂x
∂P (mj|x,w1, w2)
∂w2
. (1.5)
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This expression reflects the chain rule: the effect of x on the conditional probability of being
matched with college j, P (mj|x,w1, w2), is realized through its effects on latent utilities vj,
captured by ∂v1
∂x
and ∂v2
∂x
. ∂P (mj |x,w1,w2)
∂w1
and ∂P (mj |x,w1,w2)
∂w2
capture the effect of latent utilities
on the conditional probability of being matched with college j. There are two unknown
elements in Eq. (1.5). If (η1, η2) has enough variation such that fixing the value of x,
distinct values of (w1, w2) produce two such equations, one can solve the problem.
Formal Identification Results
Assumption 2.
(i) (i, ηi) are distributed independently of (xi, zi1, . . . , ziJ , yi1, . . . , yiJ , wi1, . . . , wiJ);
(ii) for all j, uj and vj functions are continuously differentiable.
Assumption 2(i) imposes an independence assumption. The insights presented below still
apply when extending this model using control method approach or other methods that deal
with the endogeneity problem. Moreover, in the generalized version of my model where the
unobserved terms enter the utility functions nonadditively, the assumption is much weaker
than it would be if they enter additively. The differentiability of the utility functions, uj
and vj, and the CDF of (i, ηi), F , in Assumption2 (ii) and Assumption 1(ii) in Section 3,
guarantees that the conditional probability is differentiable.
A student ends up with college j if and only if (i) the student prefers college j over the
outside option and is admitted by college j, and (ii) for each j ′ , either the student is not
admitted by college j ′ , or the student prefers college j over college j ′ , or both. Specifically,
for any given value (x, z1, . . . , zJ , y1, . . . , yJ , w1, . . . , wJ , 1, . . . , J , η1, . . . , ηJ) in the support
of (xi, zi1, . . . , ziJ , yi1, . . . , yiJ , wi1, . . . , wiJ , i1, . . . , iJ , η1i, . . . , ηJi), the indicator of student i
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being matched with college j can be written as
mj(x, z1, . . . , zJ , y1, . . . , yJ , w1, . . . , wJ , 1, . . . , J , η1, . . . , ηJ ; p)
=

1 if j > −uj(x, zj)− yj︸ ︷︷ ︸
college jThe outside option
or ηj > pj − vj(zj, x)− wj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Admitted by college j
and for all j ′ 6= j, j − j′ > −uj(x, zj)− yj + uj
′
(x, zj′ ) + yj′︸ ︷︷ ︸
college jcollege j′
or ηj′ < pj′ − vj
′
(zj′ , x)− wj′︸ ︷︷ ︸
Not admitted by college j′
0 otherwise
Integrating mj with respect to all the unobserved terms, one gets the conditional proba-
bility of the student being unmatched:
σj(x, z1, . . . , zJ , y1, . . . , yJ , w1, . . . , wJ ; p)
=
∫
mj(x, z1, . . . , zJ , y1, . . . , yJ , w1, . . . , wJ , 1, . . . , J , η1, . . . , ηJ ; p)
dF (1, . . . , J , η1, . . . , ηJ)
=:Λj(−u1(x, z1)− y1, . . . ,−uJ(x, zJ)− yJ ,
p1 − v1(z1, x)− w1, . . . , pJ − vJ(zJ , x)− wJ).
Here, Λj is some unknown function. The integration over the unobservables does not
change the additive form of the exclusive regressors in the utility functions.
I now extend the insights in the previous subsection to the general case of J colleges.
Let (x, z1, . . . , zJ) be a given value in the support of (xi, zi1, . . . , ziJ). Consider 2 different
values for the exclusive regressors (yi1, . . . , yiJ , wi1, . . . , wiJ), (y(1)i1 , . . . , y
(1)
iJ , w
(1)
i1 , . . . , w
(1)
iJ ) and
(y(2)i1 , . . . , y
(2)
iJ , w
(2)
i1 , . . . , w
(2)
iJ ). For k = 1, 2, define
σ
(k)
j = P (mij = 1|x, z1, . . . , zj, y(k)1 , . . . , y(k)J , w(k)1 , . . . , w(k)J ; p).
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Let x(l) denote a coordinate of x. As will be shown in the proof, I obtain the following
system of equations, which follows similar idea as in the simplified example in Eq. (1.5),

∂σ
(1)
1
∂x(l)
...
∂σ
(1)
J
∂x(l)
∂σ
(2)
1
∂x(l)
...
∂σ
(2)
J
∂x(l)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tx(l)
=

∂σ
(1)
1
∂y1
· · · ∂σ
(1)
1
∂yJ
∂σ
(1)
1
∂w1
· · · ∂σ
(1)
1
∂wJ
... . . . ... ... . . . ...
∂σ
(1)
J
∂y1
· · · ∂σ
(1)
J
∂yJ
∂σ
(1)
J
∂w1
· · · ∂σ
(1)
J
∂wJ
∂σ
(2)
1
∂y1
· · · ∂σ
(2)
1
∂yJ
∂σ
(2)
1
∂w1
· · · ∂σ
(2)
1
∂wJ
... . . . ... ... . . . ...
∂σ
(2)
J
∂y1
· · · ∂σ
(2)
J
∂yJ
∂σ
(2)
J
∂w1
· · · ∂σ
(2)
J
∂wJ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π
×

u1x(l)
...
uJx(l)
v1x(l)
...
vJx(l)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
β(x(l))
, (1.6)
where ujx(l) =
∂uj
∂x(l)
and vjx(l) =
∂vj
∂x(l)
. The matrix Π(x, z, y(1), y(2), w(1), w(2); p) is formed by
fixing the values of the student’s characteristics x, fixing the values of the characteristics of
all colleges, z1, . . . , zJ . The matrix depends on the derivatives with respect to the exclusive
regressors (y1, . . . , yJ , w1, . . . , wJ) of the probability of being matched to college j = 1, . . . , J .
These derivatives are calculated at 2 different values of (y1, . . . , yJ , w1, . . . , wJ).
The key identification condition is shown as follows:
Condition 1. Given (x, z1, . . . , zJ) there exists 2 values, (y(1)1 , . . . , y
(1)
J , w
(1)
1 , . . . , w
(1)
J ) and
(y(2)1 , . . . , y
(2)
J , w
(2)
1 , . . . , w
(2)
J ), in the support of (yi1, . . . , yiJ , wi1, . . . , wiJ) conditional on
(xi, zi1, . . . , ziJ)= (x, z1, . . . , zJ) such that
Π(x, z; y(1), y(2), w(1), w(2)1 ; p) has rank 2J.
Denote Πjx(l) to be the matrix formed by replacing the j − th column of matrix Π by the
vector Tx(l) . Let zj(l) denote a coordinate of zj. The next proposition, which exploits similar
ideas as in Matzkin (2018), establishes a constructive, pointwise identification at a given
(x, z1, . . . , zJ) vector, of the derivatives of uj and vj functions for each j = 1, . . . , J .
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, and Condition 1 are satisfied. Then, for
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all j = 1, . . . , J , for any l,
∂uj(x, zj)
∂x(l)
= |Π||Πjx(l)|
,
∂vj(zj, x)
∂x(l)
= |Π||Πj+Jx(l) |
.
Moreover, for any j1, j2 = 1, . . . , J , given that ∂σj1∂yj
∂σj1
∂wj
− ∂σj2
∂yj
∂σj2
∂wj
6= 0,
∂uj(x, zj)
∂zj
=
(∂σj1
∂zj
∂σj2
∂wj
− ∂σj2
∂zj
∂σj1
∂wj
)/(∂σj1
∂yj
∂σj2
∂wj
− ∂σj2
∂yj
∂σj1
∂wj
)
,
∂vj(zj, x)
∂zj
=
(∂σj1
∂zj
∂σj2
∂yj
− ∂σj2
∂zj
∂σj1
∂yj
)/(∂σj1
∂yj
∂σj2
∂wj
− ∂σj2
∂yj
∂σj1
∂wj
)
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows how to identify the derivatives of the utility functions of the student
uj and of the college vj for each j from the probabilities of being matched to the colleges.
Assuming (x, z1, . . . , zJ) have full support, under a location normalization, for each j, the
values of uj and vj are identified.
1.4.2 Identifying the Joint Distribution of Unobservables
In this subsection, given that the values of the utility functions uj and vj are known for
each j, I analyze how to recover the joint distribution of unobservables. I focus on the
conditional probability of being unmatched . In a classical (one-sided) discrete choice model,
the conditional probability of being unmatched is
P (m0|x, z, y)
=P (1 ≤ −u1(x, z1)− y1, · · · , J ≤ −uJ(x, zJ)− yJ)
=F (−u1(x, z1)− y1, · · · ,−uJ(x, zJ)− yJ).
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So once the utility functions are identified, it is straightforward to identify the CDF of the
unobserved terms. However, it is not the case in a two-sided matching model. A student not
going to any college may be because she does not want to attend any college, or because she
is not qualified for any college that she wants to attend. Formally, note that the indicator
of being unmatched
m0(x, z, y, w, , η; p)
=

1 if for all j ≥ 1, j ≤ −uj(x, zj)− yj or ηj ≤ pj − vj(zj, x)− wj
0 otherwise
.
Therefore, the conditional probability of being unmatched can be written as
P (m0 = 1|x, z, y, w; p)
=P
(
∩Jj=1 {(j ≤ −uj(x, zj)− yj) ∪ (ηj ≤ pj − vj(zj, x)− wj)}
)
=:Λ0(−u1(x, z1)− y1, . . . ,−uJ(x, zJ)− yJ , p1 − v1(z1, x)− w1, , . . . , pJ − vJ(zJ , x)− wJ).
(1.7)
Once uj and vj are identified, since the LHS in (1.7) can be recovered from the data,
Λ0() in (1.7) is also identified. The key is to find the relationship between Λ0() and the joint
CDF F .
Overview and Intuition
To illustrate the main idea of identifying the joint CDF of the unobserved terms, consider
a special case with J = 1. For this example, assume the utility of attending college is
u = u(x) + y + , the utility of not attending college is 0. The utility of the college over
the student is given by v = v(x) + w + η. In Figure 1.2, I show matching outcomes in this
game. Given any value of (x, y, w), student’s matching outcomes partition R2 into two parts,
college or no college. I focus on the conditional probability of no college to identify the CDF,
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which corresponds to the hatch area on the graph. This area can be decomposed into three
parts, R1, R2, and R3. It’s easy to see that
P (No College) =P ( < −u(x)− y or η < p− v(x)− w)
=P (R1 ∪R2) + P (R3 ∪R2)− P (R2).
The last term in the above expression is indeed the joint CDF of the unobserved terms we
want to recover since P (R2) = P ( < −u(x)−y, η < p−v(x)−w) = F (−u(x)−y, p−v(x)−w).
Therefore, as long as we can recover P (R1∪R2) and P (R3∪R2), since P (No College) on the
LHS can be estimated from the data, the joint CDF of the unobserved terms is identified.
Note that P (R1 ∪ R2) = F(−u(x) − y) is actually the marginal CDF of . It can be
recovered by considering the subset of students whose w (e.g., SAT scores) is high enough
so that these students would be qualified for college regardless of the realization of the
unobserved ability η. In this way, the effects of college’s preferences is “shut down” and
F(−u(x) − y) = P ( < −u(x) − y) = P (No College|w is high) is identified. Similarly, Fη
can be identified and as a result, the joint CDF, F is identified.
Formal Identification Results
Consider (1.7) for the general case. It’s easy to see that the joint distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity in student’s preferences, the CDF of (i1, . . . , iJ) can be recovered by consid-
ering the conditional probability of being unmatched of the sub-sample with large enough
values of (p1−v1(zi1, xi)−wi1, . . . , pJ−vJ(ziJ , xi)−wiJ), and similar for the other side. Since
I does not restrict the unobserved random terms (i1, . . . , iJ , η1i, . . . , ηJi) to be independent,
to fully identify the entire distribution of all unobserved terms, in my formal proof, I show
that Λ0() can be expressed as the sum of F , the joint CDF of (i1, . . . , iJ , η1i, . . . , ηJi), and
the joint CDFs of several subsets of (i1, . . . , iJ , η1i, . . . , ηJi). The intuition behind this, as
illustrated in Figure 1.2, is that a student not going to any college can be attributed to
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−u(x)− y
p− v(x)− w
No College
College
R1
R2 R3 
η
Figure 1.2: Decomposition of Matching Probability
several scenarios. One is that the student does not prefer any college over the outside option
and is not qualified for any college. The probability of this scenario corresponds to the joint
CDF of the unobserved terms we want to recover. The other scenarios include, for example,
that the student is not interested in the colleges that she is admitted by and is rejected by
the colleges that she wants to attend. For all these scenarios, one can express the conditional
probability by the joint CDF of a subset of the unobserved terms. So F can be identified by
subtracting the conditional probabilities of various scenarios of being unmatched, recovered
by “shutting down” the effects the corresponding subsets of the unobservables, from the con-
ditional probability of being unmatched. The following proposition states the identification
result.
Proposition 3. Suppose for each j = 1, . . . , J , uj and vj are identified. Then F , the joint
CDF of (i1, . . . , iJ , η1i, . . . , ηJi) is identified.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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1.5 Estimation
1.5.1 Nonparametric Estimation
The constructive identification results in the previous section facilitate the estimation for the
unknown values of coefficients in (1.6). Let ω denote the vector of all the observed covariates,
i.e., ω = (x, z1, . . . , zJ , y1, . . . , yJ , w1, . . . , wJ), and kω be the dimension of ω. Each of the
elements in the matrices in (1.6) can be estimated by replacing the conditional probability
σj(ω) with a nonparametric estimator, σˆj(ω), for σj(ω). Denote the estimators for Π and
Tx(l) by Π̂ and T̂x(l) , respectively. Then the estimator for the vector of derivatives β(x(l)) is
defined as
βˆ(x(l)) = Π̂−1T̂x(l) . (1.8)
In this section, we develop asymptotic properties for the estimator presented in (1.8) when
the conditional probability σj(ω) is estimated using Kernel methods. The kernel estimator
is
σˆj(ω) =
∑n
i=1mijK(ωi−ωhn )∑n
i=1 K(ωi−ωhn )
, (1.9)
where K is a kernel function and hn is a bandwidth.
I will make the following assumptions:
Assumption 3.
(i) The density fω has compact support and is continuously differentiable of order d.
(ii) The kernel function K is differentiable of order ∆, the derivatives of order ∆ are
Lipschitz, where ∆ ≥ 1. K vanishes outside a compact set, integrates to 1, and is of
order s, where s+ 1 ≤ d.
(iii) 0 < fω <∞.
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(iv) The sequence of bandwidths, hn, is such that hn → 0, nhkω+2n → ∞,
√
nhkω+2n h
s
n → 0,
[(nh2kω+2n )/ ln(n)]→∞, and
√
nhkω+2n (
√
ln(n)/(nh2kω+2n ) + hsn)2 → 0.
Assumption 3(i) requires the pdf of ω to be sufficiently smooth. Assumption 3(ii) requires
the Kernel function to be of high order and together with Assumption 3 (i), guarantees that
the bias of the estimator vanishes in the limit. Assumption 3(iii) assumes that the pdf of ω
is bounded and bounded away from zero. Assumption 3(iv) restricts the rate at which the
bandwidth hn goes to zero.
Define
K˜(ω) = (K(ω), ∂K(ω)
∂y1
, . . . ,
∂K(ω)
∂yJ
,
∂K(ω)
∂w1
, . . . ,
∂K(ω)
∂wJ
,
∂K(ω)
∂x(l)
)′ ,
Σ(ω) =

1 σ1(ω) · · · · · · σJ(ω)
σ1(ω) σ1(ω) 0 · · · 0
... 0 σ2(ω) · · · 0
... ... ... . . . ...
σJ(ω) 0 0 · · · σJ(ω)

.
The 2J × (2J + 2)(J + 1) matrix Γ is defined by (1.40)-(1.46) in the proof of Proposition 4
in the Appendix.
Let
V = Γ[Σ(ω)⊗
∫
K˜(ω˜)K˜(ω˜)′dω˜]Γ′ . (1.10)
and
Vˆ = pˆi(ω)′ [Σˆ(ω)⊗
∫
K˜(ω˜)K˜(ω˜)′dω˜]pˆi(ω) (1.11)
be an estimator for V , obtained by substituting the density and the conditional probability of
being matched by their kernel estimators, respectively, in the definition of Γ, and substituting
σj by σˆj, defined in (1.9), in the definition of Σ. The following proposition establishes the
asymptotic distribution of the nonparametric estimator βˆ(x(l)) defined in (1.8).
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Proposition 4. Suppose Assumptions 1-3 and Condition 1 hold. Then,
√
nhkω+2n (βˆ(x(l))− β(x(l))) d→ N(0, V )
and Vˆ is a consistent estimator for V .
1.5.2 Semiparametric Estimation
Although nonparametric estimation imposes less restrictive assumptions on the functional
form of the utilities, the nonparametric estimators inevitably converge slowly. The conver-
gence rate of the estimators decreases with the number of variables involved, so called “curse
of dimensionality.” This issue is particularly challenging in the context of matching as the
number of colleges or firms is usually large. In this section, I consider a semiparametric
model, where the utility functions are specified parametrically, and the distribution of the
unobserved heterogeneity is still not parametrically specified. Based on the nonparametric
identification results in Section 4 and the idea in Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989), I derive
moment conditions where the elements other than the parameters of interest can be esti-
mated using average derivative estimators. This allows us to propose a GMM estimator that
is root-n consistency and asymptotically normal.
The model considered in this section is, for each j = 1, . . . , J ,
uij = β′xi + γ′zij + yij + ij
vji = α′xi + ρ′zij + wij + ηji.
The parameter of interest is θ = (β, α, γ, ρ). Here I still do not make any parametric
assumptions on the joint distribution of (i1, . . . , iJ , ηi1, . . . , ηiJ). Moreover, I assume that
the cutoffs are unobserved. The utility of the outside option is normalized to 0.
Denote the vector of all the observed covariates by ωi, i.e., ωi = (xi, zi, yi, wi), with zi =
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(zi1, . . . , ziJ), yi = (yi1, . . . , yiJ) and wi = (wi1, . . . , wiJ). Let σj(ω) = P (mij = 1|ω = ωi).
My nonparametric identification results in section 4 imply the following moment conditions:
for each j = 0, 1, . . . , J and j ′ = 1, . . . , J ,
∂σj(ω)
∂x
= β
J∑
j′=1
∂σj(ω)
∂yj′
+ α
J∑
j′=1
∂σj(ω)
∂wj′
(1.12)
∂σj(ω)
∂zj
= γ ∂σj(ω)
∂yj
+ ρ∂σj(ω)
∂wj
. (1.13)
While β ′xi is constant in all the utility functions of student i over colleges, β is still iden-
tified from the comparison between colleges and the outside option. Because the conditional
probabilities σ0, σ1, . . . , σJ sum up to one, I use only the moment conditions for j = 1, . . . , J .
In the following, I maintain the same assumptions as in Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989).
Assumption 4.
(i) The support Ω of ω is a convex, possibly unbounded, subset of Rkω with a nonempty
interior Ω0.
(ii) The density function f is continuous in the components of ω for all ω ∈ Rdω , so
that f(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ ∂Ω, where ∂Ω denotes the boundary of Ω. Moreover, f is
continuously differentiable in the components of ω for all ω ∈ Rdω .
(iii) For each j, the components of the vector ∂σj(ω)
∂ω
and of the matrix [∂f(ω)
∂ω
](mj, ω′) have
finite second moments. Besides, ∂f(ω)
∂ω
and ∂[σj(ω)f(ω)]
∂ω
satisfy the following Lipschitz
conditions: for some r(ω),and
E[(1 + |mj|+‖ω‖)(r(ω))]2 <∞,
‖∂f(ω + ζ)
∂ω
− ∂f(ω)
∂ω
‖< r(ω)‖ζ‖,
and
‖∂[f(ω + ζ)σj(ω + ζ)]
∂ω
− ∂[f(ω)σj(ω)]
∂ω
‖< r(ω)‖ζ‖.
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Assumption 4(i) implies that ω is continuously distributed and that no component of ω
is functionally determined by other components.11 Assumption 4(ii) gives a key boundary
condition, which permits unbounded covariates and gives the smoothness conditions on the
density function. Assumption 4(iii) requires the existence of various moments and imposes
smoothness requirements on f(ω) and σj(ω).
The following lemma derives the moment conditions that I use to construct the GMM
estimator for the parameter of interest.
Lemma 2. Given Assumptions 2(ii) and 4, the conditions (1.12) and (1.13) imply the
following conditions: for each j,
E[mj
∂f(ω)
∂x
] = β
J∑
j=1
E[mj
∂f(ω)
∂yj′
] + α
J∑
j=1
E[mj
∂f(ω)
∂wj′
] (1.14)
E[mj
∂f(ω)
∂zj
] = γE[mj
∂f(ω)
∂yj
] + ρE[mj
∂f(ω)
∂wj
]. (1.15)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let the kg = J(kx + kzj) moment conditions
g(θ) = B − Aθ (1.16)
11Continuous random variables guarantee that the density is well-defined when doing integration by parts.
When some covariates are discrete, the coefficients of these covariates can be estimated using the estimator
developed by Horowitz and Härdle (1996). Alternatively, we can use full mean method by Newey (1994),
which provides an estimator that has a bit slower convergence rate than the one discussed in this paper.
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where
A =

(∑J
j=1E[m1
∂f(ω)
∂yj
] ∑Jj=1E[m1 ∂f(ω)∂wj ]
)
⊗ Ikx 0kx×2kz1
0kz1×2kx
(
E[m1 ∂f(ω)∂y1 ] E[m1
∂f(ω)
∂w1
]
)
⊗ Ikz1
... ...(∑J
j=1E[mJ
∂f(ω)
∂yj
] ∑Jj=1E[mJ ∂f(ω)∂wj ]
)
⊗ Ikx 0kx×2kzJ
0kzJ×2kx
(
E[mJ ∂f(ω)∂yJ ] E[mJ
∂f(ω)
∂wJ
]
)
⊗ IkzJ

,
(1.17)
B =

E[m1 ∂f(ω)∂x ]
E[m1 ∂f(ω)∂z1 ]
...
E[mJ ∂f(ω)∂x ]
E[mJ ∂f(ω)∂zJ ]

, (1.18)
and kx and kzj denote the dimension of x and zj, respectively.
The expectation terms in (1.17) and (1.18) can be estimated using the average derivative
estimator:
Eˆ[mj
∂f(ω)
∂ω
] = 1
n
n∑
i=1
mij
∂fˆ(ωi)
∂ωi
, (1.19)
where ∂fˆ(ω)
∂ω
is the kernel density estimator
∂fˆ(ω)
∂ω
= 1
n− 1
1
hkω+1n
∑
l 6=i
K
′(ωl − ω
hn
). (1.20)
Substituting each expectation terms E[mj ∂f(ω)∂ω ] with its estimator Eˆ[mj
∂f(ω)
∂ω
] in (1.17)
and (1.18), respectively, one obtains Aˆn and Bˆn. The sample analogue of the moment
conditions are
gˆn(θ) = Bˆn − Aˆnθ. (1.21)
The GMM estimator for θ, denoted by θˆ, is defined as the minimizer of the GMM criterion
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Qn(θ) = −gˆn(θ)′Wˆ gˆn(θ), where Wˆ is some positive semi-definite weight matrix and Wˆ p→ W .
Specifically, θˆ can be written as
θˆ = (AˆWˆ Aˆ)−1(AˆWˆ Bˆ). (1.22)
Assumption 5.
(i) The kernel function K is symmetrical about the origin, bounded, differentiable, and
of order s. s = kω+22 if kω is even and s =
kω+3
2 if kω is odd, where kω denote the
dimension of the covariates. In addition,
∫
K(t)dt = 1.
(ii) The bandwidth hn satisfies nh2sn → 0 and nhkω+2n →∞ as n→∞.
Assumption 6.
(i) A′jWAj is non-singular.
(ii) E[‖∂f(ω)
ω
‖2] is finite, where ‖ ‖ refers to Euclidean norm.
Assumption 5(i) requires K to be a higher-order kernel to assure the bias of the average
derivative estimators has size o(n−1/2). Assumption 5(ii) imposes requirements on the con-
vergence rate of the bandwidth hn, which is relatively faster than the optimal convergence
rate used in density estimation. Both assumptions are needed to prevent the asymptotic
distribution of
√
n(Eˆ[mij ∂f(ω)∂ω ] − E[mij ∂f(ω)∂ω ]) from having a nonzero mean. Assumption 6
is regularity conditions for GMM estimator.
The following proposition establishes the asymptotic properties of my GMM estimator.
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions 1,2,4, 5, 6, and Condition 1 hold, then the GMM
estimator, defined by (1.22), is consistent for θ. Furthermore, we have
√
n(θˆ − θ) d→ N(0,Σθ), (1.23)
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where
Σθ = (A′WA)−1A′WTΣδT
′
WA(A′WA)−1, (1.24)
T =

T1 0 · · · 0
0 T2 · · · 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 · · · TJ

, Tj =
 Ikx 0kx×kzj −β ⊗ 11×J −α⊗ 11×J
0kzj×kx Ikzj −γ ⊗ 11×J −ρ⊗ 11×J
 , (1.25)
Σδ = E[R(ω)R(ω)
′ ]− δδ′ , (1.26)
R(ω) =
(
R1(ω)
′
. . . RJ(ω)
′
)′
, Rj(ω) = f(ω)
∂σj(ω)
∂ωj
− [mj − σj(ω)]∂f(ω)
∂ωj
, (1.27)
δ = (E[∂f(ω)
∂ω1
m1]
′
, . . . , E[∂f(ω)
∂ωJ
mJ ]
′)′ , ωj = ω\z−j = (x′ , z′j, y1, . . . , yJ , w1, . . . , wJ). (1.28)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The efficient GMM estimator θˆ∗ can be obtained by letting W = Σ−1g = (TΣδT
′)−1.
Formally, the asymptotic distribution of θˆ∗ is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Under the same assumptions as Proposition 5, the efficient GMM estimator,
defined by (1.22), has the following asymptotic distribution
√
n(θˆ∗ − θ) d→ N(0,Σ∗θ), (1.29)
where
Σ∗θ = (A′(TΣδT
′)−1A)−1. (1.30)
A consistent estimator of Σ∗θ can be obtained by replacing A, T , and Σδ in (1.30) with
Aˆ, Tˆ , and Σˆδ, respectively, where Aˆ is defined as in (1.21), Tˆ is defined by substituting θ
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with its estimator θˆ in (1.25),
Σˆδ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Rˆn(ωi)Rˆn(ωi)
′ − δˆδˆ′ ,
Rˆn(ωi) =
(
Rˆn1(ωi)
′
. . . RˆnJ(ωi)
′
)′
, Rˆnj(ω) =
1
n− 1
1
hkω+1n
∑
l 6=i
(mij −mlj)K ′(ωi − ωj
hn
),
δˆ = (Eˆ[∂f(ω)
∂ω1
m1]
′
, . . . , Eˆ[∂f(ω)
∂ωJ
mJ ]
′)′ ,
and Eˆ[∂f(ω)
∂ωj
mj] is defined by (1.19) and (1.20).
1.6 Simulations
In this section I present evidence for the performance of my semiparametric estimator in
Section 5. I generate payoff matrices from the random utility model
uij = βx1i + γzij + yij + ij
vji = αx2i + wi + ηji,
where β, γ, and α are scalar parameters, zij, yij, x2i, and wi are generated from the standard
normal distribution, respectively, x1i is generated from the uniform distribution on [0, 1].
ij = νi + ˜ij and ηij = νi + η˜ji, where νi is generated from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]
and (˜ij, η˜ji) is generated from the standard distribution with zero mean and with variance
matrix equal to the identity matrix.
In each of 100 simulations, I simulate data for one single market of size n = 100, 1000,
2000, 5000, 10000, with J = 3 via the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale
and Shapley, 1962). When n = 100, the college capacities are assumed to be (15, 20, 13).
The total number of available seats does not exceed the number of students in the market.
The capacities increase proportionally as we increase the sample size n. The estimator is
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defined as (1.22). The moments I use here are
E[m0
∂f(x1, y1, . . . , , yJ)
∂x1
]− β
J∑
j=1
E[m0
∂f(x1, y1, . . . , , yJ)
∂yj
] = 0
and for j = 1, . . . , J ,
E[mj
∂f(zj, yj)
∂zj
]− γE[mj ∂f(zj, yj)
∂yj
] = 0
E[mj
∂f(x2, w)
∂x2
]− αE[mj ∂f(x2, w)
∂w
] = 0.
Here, to reduce the dimension of covariates in the kernel function to ease the computational
burden, for each moment condition, I integrate out “irrelevant” variables in (1.14) and (1.15),
and hereby obtain the above moment conditions. I used a Gaussian kernel of order s = 4
and bandwidth for each coordinate k
hk = stdkn−2/(2kcov+s+2),
where stdk denotes the standard deviation of the sample and kcov denotes the number of
coordinates of the density. The bandwidth used here is smaller than the optimal one for
estimation of the density to reduce the asymptotic bias of the average derivative estimates
(Härdle and Tsybakov, 1993).
Table 1.1 reports the results for βˆ, γˆ, and αˆ, the column βˆ denotes the average over
simulations of the value of βˆ, ¯ˆstd denotes the average over simulations of the estimated
standard deviations of βˆ, std denotes the empirical standard deviation of βˆ. Analogous
results are reported for γˆ and αˆ. It shows that the estimates of the coefficient of the (student,
college) specific variable zij, γˆ, are quite close to the true value even when n = 100. This
implies that the limiting model serves as a reasonable approximation of the finite model even
with moderate sample size. The estimates for the student-specific attribute x2i, αˆ, is getting
closer to the true value as n = 2, 000. The estimation of β involves involves J + 1 covariates,
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Table 1.1: Mean and Standard Deviations of Semiparametric Estimator
β0 = 0.5 γ0 = 0.5 α0 = 0.5
n βˆ std
¯ˆ
std γˆ std
¯ˆ
std αˆ std
¯ˆ
std
100 -7.47 46.93 15.27 0.51 0.24 0.16 0.03 1.04 0.67
1000 0.49 1.13 0.53 0.50 0.06 0.04 0.36 0.54 0.30
2000 0.53 0.54 0.34 0.50 0.04 0.03 0.49 0.41 0.20
5000 0.51 0.32 0.19 0.50 0.03 0.02 0.50 0.23 0.11
10000 0.49 0.20 0.13 0.50 0.02 0.01 0.51 0.14 0.07
more than the other two parameters γ and α, and the mean of the estimates βˆ gets close to
the true value when n = 1, 000.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I studied the nonparametric identification and estimation of a many-to-one
matching model with non-transferable utility under a price-theoretic framework. The frame-
work proposed in this paper only uses data on matching outcomes, not on specific assignment
mechanism or reported preferences. I focused on a single large market in which the number
of agents on one side (e.g. students or workers) goes to infinity while the number of agents
on the other side (e.g. colleges or firms) remains fixed. My identification results showed that
the derivatives of the utility functions and the joint distribution of the two sides’ unobserved
random terms are both identified. My nonparametric estimator was proposed based on the
identification results using Kernel method and the asymptotic properties were established.
Based on the identification results, I also proposed a semiparametric estimator that is root-n
consistent, asymptotically normal. The simulation results showed that the performance of
my semiparametric estimator was good under moderate sample size.
There are several directions for future research. First, in this paper I considered data on
one market and assumed that the unobserved heterogeneity is i.i.d. across students. However,
if multi-market data is available, the model can be extended by relaxing this assumption and
considering college’s unobserved characteristics so that students exhibit correlated preference
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over each college.
Second, the point identification of the utility parameters requires that the excluded regres-
sors have continuous support. Nevertheless, it is quite common that the excluded regressors
are discrete. Therefore, it could be important to re-examine the identification results under
such alternative assumption on the excluded regressors.
Third, this paper assumed that colleges value each student independently instead of car-
ing about the composition of the incoming class (as a group). While both assumptions can
find their applications in the real world, the latter one is more difficult to model. Specifi-
cally, extending the model to allow for complementary preference of colleges raises two main
challenges. First, in this context, it’s natural to consider group stability, a strong solution
concept that considers potential deviations by a group of students. Second, there are multi-
ple equilibria even when the number of students is large (Che, Kim, and Kojima, 2019). I
am currently working on the solutions to these issues in a separate paper.
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Appendix
1.A Student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm
(Gale and Shapley, 1962)
Step 1.
a. Each student applies to her highest ranked college.
(i) Each college with some quota nsj picks the nsj highest ranked students among the
ones who applied, puts them on the wait list, and rejects the rest.
Step k.
a. Each student rejected at step (k− 1) applies to her most preferred college who has not
yet rejected her.
(i) The college considers the nsj highest ranked students among those who applied and
on the wait list and puts them on wait list, rejecting the rest.
Stop. The process repeats, and terminates when all students are either matched or have
applied to all the colleges they are willing to attend.
1.B Proofs
Before the proof of Lemma 1, I introduce the definition of regular in Azevedo and Leshno
(2016), which is the prerequisite for uniqueness. Let Fxi×zi×i×ηi denote the joint distribution
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of (xi, zi, i, ηi).
Definition 3. The distribution of student types Fxi×zi×i×ηi is regular if the image under
D(·|Fxi×zi×i×ηi) of the closure of the set
{p ∈ [0, 1]J : D(·|Fxi×zi×i×ηi) is not continuously differentiable at p}
has Lebesgue measure 0.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. To apply Theorem 1 in Azevedo and Leshno (2016) to prove the lemma, we only need
to check that the distribution of student types is regular.
Recall that the limit demand function of college j can be written as
Dj(p) = E[mij(xi, i, ηi, zij; zi,−j, p)]
=
∫ {
1(pj ≤ vj(zij, xi, ηji))
× ∏
j 6=j′
[
1− 1(uj(xi, zij, ij) < uj
′
(xi, zij′ , ij′ ))1(pj′ < vj
′
(zij′ , xi, ηj′ i))
]}
dFXi×Yi × Fi×ηi
Since Fi×ηi is continuously differentiable and vj() is continuously differentiable in its last
argument, the demand function Dj is continuous differentiable in p.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proof is similar in spirit to Azevedo and Leshno (2016) and Agarwal and Somaini
(2018).
Uniform Convergence of the Demand Function
Firstly, we show that the demand in the finite economy converges uniformly in p to that
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in the limiting economy. That is, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , J},
sup
p
|Dn,j(xn, znj , n, ηn; zn−j, p)−Dj(p)| p→ 0. (1.31)
It is equivalent to show
sup
p
| 1
n
n∑
i=1
mij(xi, i, ηi, zij; zi,−j, p)− E[mij(xi, i, ηi, zij; zi,−j, p)]| p→ 0,
where the expectation is taken with respect to (xi, zi, i, ηi).
Recall that
mij(xi, i, ηi, zij; zi,−j, p)
=1(j ∈ Ch(xi, zij, ηi; p)
× ∏
j′ 6=j
[
1− 1
(
uj(xi, zij, ij) < uj
′
(xi, zij′ , ij′ )
)
1(j ′ ∈ Ch(xi, zi, ηi; p)
]
.
Since (i) p ∈ [0, 1]J , which is a compact set, (ii) mij(xi, i, ηi, zij; zi,−j, p) is continuous at
each p ∈ [0, 1]J with probability one since v(·) is continuous in ηji and ηji has a continu-
ous distribution, (iii) mij(xi, i, ηi, zij; zi,−j, p) is dominated by the constant 2, applying the
uniform law of large numbers (Newey and McFadden, 1994, Lemma 2.4) proves that (1.31)
holds and Dj(p) is continuous in p.
Convergence of the Equilibrium Cutoff
Now that we have the uniform convergence of the demand function, the second part of
the proof is to show p(n)∗ is close enough to p∗.
Let Qn denote the excess demand in the finite economy
Qn(p;xn, zn, n, ηn, s) = ‖Dn(p;xn, zn, n, ηn)− s‖ ,
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and Q0 be the excess demand in the limiting economy
Q0(p; s) = ‖D(p)− s‖ ,
where Dn and D stacks the demand function of all colleges in the finite economy and limiting
economy, respectively. For simplicity of notation, we suppress arguments other than p in the
following steps.
Note that the following conditions hold:12
(i) Q0(p) is uniquely minimized by p∗ since Q0(p∗) = 0 and p∗ is the unique solution by
Lemma 1 and Q0(p) is non-negative;
(ii) Any pn ∈ P(n) minimizes Qn(p) since Qn(pn) = 0 and Qn(p) is non-negative;
(iii) p ∈ [0, 1]J , which is compact;
(iv) Q0(p) is continuous since D(p) is continuous, which is established in previous steps
by uniform law of large numbers;
(v) sup
p
|Qn(p)−Q0(p)| p→ 0 by the continuous mapping theorem and (1.31).
Condition (ii) implies that Qn(pn) ≤ Qn(p∗). Therefore,
sup
pn∈Pn
Q0(pn)−Q0(p∗)
= sup
pn∈Pn
Q0(pn)−Qn(p∗) +Qn(p∗)−Q0(p∗)
≤ sup
pn∈Pn
Q0(pn)−Qn(pn) +Qn(p∗)−Q0(p∗)
= sup
pn∈Pn
[Q0(pn)−Qn(pn)] +Qn(p∗)−Q0(p∗)
≤ 2 sup
p∈[0,1]J
|Q0(pn)−Qn(pn)|
The last inequality is because Pn ⊂ [0, 1]J .
12The idea of the proof is similar in spirit to the proof of consistency of M-estimators Newey and McFadden
(1994).
39
Thus, for any δ > 0,
P( sup
pn∈Pn
|Q0(pn)−Q0(p∗)| > δ) ≤ P(2 sup
p
|Q0(pn)−Qn(pn)| > δ2)→ 0. (1.32)
By conditions (i), (iv) and the fact that [0, 1]J ∩ {p : ||p− p∗|| > } is compact, we have
inf
p: ||p−p∗||>
Qo(p) > Q0(p∗).
As a result, for any  > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that
inf
p: ||p−p∗||>
Qo(p)−Q0(p∗) > δ,
which implies that
sup
pn∈Pn
||pn − p∗|| > ⇒ inf
pn∈Pn
Qo(pn)−Q0(p∗) > δ.
Hence,
P( sup
pn∈Pn
||pn − p∗|| > ) ≤ P( inf
pn∈Pn
Qo(pn)−Q0(p∗) > δ)
≤ P( sup
pn∈Pn
|Qo(pn)−Q0(p∗)| > δ)→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For simplicity of notations, assume x and z are scalars. For k = 1, 2, let ω =
(x, z, y(k), w(k)). For any j, j ′ = 1, . . . , J , taking derivaitves of σ(k)
j′ with respect to yj, wj, x,
and zj, respectively, one obtains
∂σ
(k)
j′
∂yj
= −∂Λj′ (ω
(k))
∂j
(1.33)
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∂σ
(k)
j′
∂wj
= −∂Λj′ (ω
(k))
∂ηj
(1.34)
∂σ
(k)
j′
∂x
= −
J∑
j=1
∂Λj′ (ω(k))
∂j
ujx −
J∑
j=1
∂Λj′ (ω(k))
∂ηj
vjx (1.35)
∂σ
(k)
j′
∂zj
= −∂Λj′ (ω
(k))
∂j
ujzj −
∂Λj′ (ω(k))
∂ηj
vjzj (1.36)
Substituting (1.33)-(1.34) into (1.36), one gets
∂σ
(k)
j′
∂x
=
J∑
j=1
ujx
∂σ
(k)
j′
∂yj
+
J∑
j=1
vjx
∂σ
(k)
j′
∂wj
(1.37)
∂σ
(k)
j′
∂zj
= ujzj
∂σ
(k)
j′
∂yj
+ vjzj
∂σ
(k)
j′
∂wj
. (1.38)
Equation (1.37) and (1.38) imply (1.6) in Section 4.2. Denote, as in the statement of the
proposition, Πjx(l) to be the matrix formed by replacing the j − th column of matrix Π by
the vector Tx(l) . Let x(l) denote one coordinate of x and zj(l) denote a coordinate of zj. By
the Cramer’s rule, for j = 1, . . . , J ,
∂uj(x, zj)
∂x(l)
= |Π||Πjx(l) |
,
∂vj(zj, x)
∂x(l)
= |Π||Πj+Jx(l) |
.
Moreover, for any j1, j2 = 1, . . . , J , given that ∂σj1∂yj
∂σj1
∂wj
− ∂σj2
∂yj
∂σj2
∂wj
6= 0,
∂uj(x, zj)
∂zj
=
(∂σj1
∂zj
∂σj2
∂wj
− ∂σj2
∂zj
∂σj1
∂wj
)/(∂σj1
∂yj
∂σj2
∂wj
− ∂σj2
∂yj
∂σj1
∂wj
)
,
∂vj(zj, x)
∂zj
=
(∂σj1
∂zj
∂σj2
∂yj
− ∂σj2
∂zj
∂σj1
∂yj
)/(∂σj1
∂yj
∂σj2
∂wj
− ∂σj2
∂yj
∂σj1
∂wj
)
.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Wlog, we prove the identification of F when J = 2. The argument applies to general
cases for any positive integer J . For any j, let ¯j = −u(x, zj)−yj and η¯j = pj−v(zj, x)−wj.
Note that Λ0(¯1, ¯2, η¯1, η¯2) in (1.7) can be written as a linear combination of joint c.d.f. of
subsets of (1, 2, η1, η2):
Λ0(¯1, ¯2, η¯1, η¯2)
=P(1 ≤ ¯1, 2 ≤ ¯2, η1 ≤ η¯1, η2 ≤ η¯2) + P(1 ≤ ¯1, 2 ≤ ¯2, η1 > η¯1, η2 ≤ η¯2)
+P(1 > ¯1, 2 ≤ ¯2, η1 ≤ η¯1, η2 ≤ η¯2) + P(1 ≤ ¯1, 2 ≤ ¯2, η1 ≤ η¯1, η2 > η¯2)
+P(1 ≤ ¯1, 2 > ¯2, η1 ≤ η¯1, η2 ≤ η¯2) + P(1 ≤ ¯1, 2 ≤ ¯2, η1 > η¯1, η2 > η¯2)
+P(1 ≤ ¯1, 2 > ¯2, η1 > η¯1, η2 ≤ η¯2) + P(1 > ¯1, 2 ≤ ¯2, η1 ≤ η¯1, η2 > η¯2)
+P(1 > ¯1, 2 > ¯2, η1 ≤ η¯1, η2 ≤ η¯2)
=P(1 ≤ ¯1, 2 ≤ ¯2, η1 ≤ η¯1, η2 ≤ η¯2) + P(1 ≤ ¯1, 2 ≤ ¯2, η1 > η¯1)
+P(1 > ¯1, η1 ≤ η¯1, η2 ≤ η¯2) + P(2 ≤ ¯2, η1 ≤ η¯1, η2 > η¯2)
+P(1 ≤ ¯1, 2 > ¯2, η2 ≤ η¯2)
=F (¯1, ¯2, η¯1, η¯2) + F12(¯1, ¯2)− F12η1(¯1, ¯2, η¯1) + Fη1η2(η¯1, η¯2)− F1η1η2(¯1, η¯1, η¯2)
+F2η1(¯2, η¯1)− F2η1η2(¯2, η¯1, η¯2) + F1η2(¯1, η¯2)− F12η2(¯1, ¯2, η¯2) (1.39)
It’s easy to see that
F12(¯1, ¯2) = Λ0(¯1, ¯2,−∞,−∞)
F1η2(¯1, η¯2) = Λ0(¯1,−∞,−∞, η¯2)
F2η1(¯2, η¯1) = Λ0(−∞, ¯2, η¯1,−∞)
Fη1η2(η¯1, η¯2) = Λ0(−∞,−∞, η¯1, η¯2)
42
Besides,
Λ0(¯1, ¯2, η¯1,−∞) = P
(
{(1 ≤ ¯1) ∪ (η1 ≤ η¯1)} ∩ (2 ≤ ¯2)
)
= P
(
{(1 ≤ ¯1) ∩ (2 ≤ ¯2)} ∩ {(η1 ≤ η¯1) ∩ (2 ≤ ¯2)}
)
= P
(
(1 ≤ ¯1) ∩ (2 ≤ ¯2)
)
+ P
(
(η1 ≤ η¯1) ∩ (2 ≤ ¯2)
)
− P
(
(1 ≤ ¯1) ∩ (2 ≤ ¯2) ∩ (η1 ≤ η¯1)
)
= F12(¯1, ¯2) + F2η1(¯2, η¯1)− F12η1(¯1, ¯2, η¯1).
Therefore, F12η1(¯1, ¯2, η¯1) = Λ0(¯1, ¯2,−∞,−∞)+Λ0(−∞, ¯2, η¯1,−∞)−Λ0(¯1, ¯2, η¯1,−∞)
is identified. Similarly, F12η2 , F1η1η2 and F2η1η2 are identified. Then F (¯1, ¯2, η¯1, η¯2) is also
identified from (1.39).
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. Recall that the conditions (1.12) and (1.13):
∂σj(ω)
∂x
= β
J∑
j′=1
∂σj(ω)
∂yj′
+ α
J∑
j=1
∂σj(ω)
∂wj′
∂σj(ω)
∂zj
= γ ∂σj(ω)
∂yj
+ ρ∂σj(ω)
∂wj
.
Multiplying the above equations by the density functions f(ω) and taking expectation
on both sides, one get
E[∂σj(ω)
∂x
f(ω)] = β
J∑
j=1
E[∂σj(ω)
∂yj
f(ω)] + α
J∑
j=1
E[∂σj(ω)
∂wj
f(ω)]
E[∂σj(ω)
∂zj
f(ω)] = γE[∂σj(ω)
∂yj
f(ω)] + ρE[∂σj(ω)
∂wj
f(ω)].
Assumptions 1(ii) and 2(ii) guarantees that σj is continuously differentiable in the com-
ponents of ω for all ω ∈ Ω¯, where Ω¯ differs from Ω0 by a set of measure zero. Also,
E(m2j |ω) = σj(ω) and therefore is continuous in ω. These conditions, together with As-
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sumption 4, imply that Assumptions 1-3 in Powell et al. (1989) are satisfied. Hence, by
Lemma 2.1 in Powell et al. (1989), the above two equations can be written as
−2E[∂f(ω)
∂x
mj] = −2β
J∑
j=1
E[∂f(ω)
∂yj
mj]− 2α
J∑
j=1
E[∂f(ω)
∂wj
mj]
−2E[∂f(ω)
∂zj
mj] = −2γE[∂f(ω)
∂yj
mj]− 2ρE[∂f(ω)
∂wj
mj],
which proves the moment conditions in Lemma 3.
Before the proof of Proposition 4, we introduce two lemmas. For any j = 1, . . . , J , let
hj(ω) = (h1(ω), hj2(ω))
′ , where h1(ω) = f(ω) is the density of ω and hj2(ω) = E[mj|ω]h1(ω).
For simplicity, denote ∂h1(ω)
∂ω
by h1ω and denote ∂h
j
2(ω)
∂ω
by hj2w.
Lemma 3. Let H denote the set of functions h that satisfy Assumption 3(i). Let
∥∥∥∥h∥∥∥∥
1
denote
the Sobolev norm of order 1. That is, ‖h‖1= max
l≤1
sup
ω∈Ω
∥∥∥∥∂lh(x)∂xl
∥∥∥∥. Define the functional ϕω(·)
on H by
ϕω(h, ω) =
∂(h2(ω)
h1(ω))
∂ω
= h2ω
h1
− h1ωh2
h21
.
Assume that for any j = 1, . . . , J , hj = (h1, hj2) belongs to H and it is such that for τ > 0
and all ω, h1(ω) > τ and hj2(ω) > τ . Then there exists finite a > 0 and τ0 > 0 such that, for
all h˜j ∈ H with ‖h˜j‖1≤ τ0 and all ω,
ϕω(hj + h˜j, ω)− ϕω(hj, ω) = Dϕω(hj, ω; h˜j) +Rϕω(hj, ω; h˜j),
where
Dϕω(hj, ω; h˜j) =
h˜j2ωh1 − hj2ωh˜1 − h˜1ωhj2 − h1ωh˜j2
h21
− 2h1ωh
j
2h˜1
h31
;
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Rϕω(hj, ω; h˜j) =
(hj2ω + h˜j2ω)(h1 + h˜1)− (h1ω + h˜1ω)(hj2 + h˜j2)
(h1 + h˜1)2
− h
j
2ωh1 − h1ωhj2
h21
− h˜
j
2ωh1 − hj2ωh˜1 − h˜1ωhj2 − h1ωh˜j2
h21
+ 2h1ωh
j
2h˜1
h31
.
Moreover, ∣∣∣∣Dϕω(hj, ω; h˜j)∣∣∣∣ ≤ a‖h˜j‖1, and ∣∣∣∣Rϕω(hj, ω; h˜j)∣∣∣∣ ≤ a‖h˜j‖21.
Proof. Define the functional
ϕω(h, ω) =
∂(h2(ω)
h1(ω))
∂ω
= h2ω
h1
− h1ωh2
h21
.
Then, ∂σˆj(ω)
∂ω
= ϕω(hˆj, ω) and ∂σj(ω)∂ω = ϕω(h
j, ω).
Let τ0 = min {τ, 1}. We first show that for all ‖h˜j‖1≤ τ0,
ϕω(hj + h˜j, ω)− ϕω(hj, ω) = Dϕω(hj, ω; h˜j) +Rϕω(hj, ω; h˜j).
Define
Dϕω(hj, ω; h˜j) =
h˜j2ωh1 − hj2ωh˜1 − h˜1ωhj2 − h1ωh˜j2
h21
− 2h1ωh
j
2h˜1
h31
and
Rϕω(hj, ω; h˜j) = ϕω(hj + h˜j, ω)− ϕω(hj, ω)−Dϕω(hj, ω; h˜j).
Denote N ′ , N , D′ , and D by
N
′ = (hj2ω + h˜j2ω)(h1 + h˜1)− (h1ω + h˜1ω)(hj2 + h˜j2),
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N = hj2ωh1 − h1ωhj2,
D
′ = (h1 + h˜1)2,
D = h21.
Then
ϕω(hj + h˜j, ω)− ϕω(hj, ω) = (h
j
2ω + h˜j2ω)(h1 + h˜1)− (h1ω + h˜1ω)(hj2 + h˜j2)
(h1 + h˜1)2
− h
j
2ωh1 − h1ωhj2
h21
= N
′
D′
− N
D
.
We employ the following equality used in Matzkin (2015) to derive Rhϕω(hj, ω; h˜j)
N
′
D′
− N
D
= N
′
D −ND′
D2
− (D
′ −D)(N ′D −ND′)
D′D2
.
We also have
N
′ = N + hj2ωh˜1 + h˜j2ωh1 − h1ωh˜2 − h˜1ωh2 +RN ,
D
′ = D + 2h1h˜1 +DN ,
where
RN = h˜j2ωh˜1 − h˜1ωh˜j2 and DN = (h˜j2)2.
Then
N ′D −ND′ = (hj2ωh˜1 + h˜j2ωh1 − h1ωh˜j2 − h˜1ωhj2)D +RND +N · 2h1h˜1 +NDN ,
D
′ −D = 2h1h˜j2 +DN ,
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and
Rϕω(hj, ω; h˜j) =
DRN −NDN
D2
− (D
′ −D)(N ′D −ND′)
D2D′
.
It remains to show that for some a > 0,
∣∣∣∣Dϕω(hj, ω; h˜j)∣∣∣∣ ≤ a‖h˜j‖1, and ∣∣∣∣Rϕω(hj, ω; h˜j)∣∣∣∣ ≤ a‖h˜j‖21.
Let a = max
{
4‖hj‖1
τ2 +
2‖hj‖21
τ3 ,
4‖hj‖21
τ4 +
(2‖hj‖1+1)(8‖hj‖31+4‖hj‖21)
τ6
}
Since h1 > τ and |h˜1| ≤ τ , it follows that h1 + h˜1 > τ/2. It then follows that D > τ 2 and
D
′
> τ 2/4. So
|Dϕω(hj, ω; h˜j)| ≤ (4‖h
j‖1
τ 2
+ 2‖h
j‖21
τ 3
)‖h˜j‖1
≤ a‖h˜j‖1.
Also, for all h˜j with ‖hj‖1< τ ,
∣∣∣∣D∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖hj‖21, |RN | ≤ 2‖h˜j‖21, |N | ≤ 2‖hj‖21, |DN | ≤ ‖h˜j‖21,
∣∣∣∣D′ −D∣∣∣∣ ≤ (2‖hj‖1+1)‖h˜j‖1,
|N ′D −ND′ | ≤ (8‖hj‖31+4‖hj‖21)‖h˜j‖21.
Therefore,
|Rϕω(hj, ω; h˜j)| ≤
(4‖hj‖21
τ 4
+ (2‖h
j‖1+1)(8‖hj‖31+4‖hj‖21)
τ 6
)
‖h˜j‖21
≤ a‖h˜j‖21.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Let (y, w) = (y1, . . . , yJ , w1, . . . , wJ). Let h = (h1, . . . , hJ). Define the functionals
ΨΠ(h, ω(1), ω(2)) =

ϕ(y,w)(h1, ω(1))
...
ϕ(y,w)(hJ , ω(1))
ϕ(y,w)(h1, ω(2))
...
ϕ(y,w)(hJ , ω(2))

,
Ψx(l)(h, ω
(1), ω(2)) =
[
ϕx(l)(h1, ω(1)) · · · ϕx(l)(hJ , ω(1)) ϕx(l)(h1, ω(2)) · · · ϕx(l)(hJ , ω(2))
]
,
and
Ξ(h, ω(1), ω(2)) = [ΨΠ(h, ω(1), ω(2))]−1Ψx(l)(h, ω
(1), ω(2)).
For simplicity, we suppress (ω(1), ω(2)) in the arguments in the following steps. By Lemma
3, it can shown that there exists finite a1 > 0 and τ1 > 0, a linear funcitonal DΞ, and a
functional RΞ such that, when ‖h‖1< τ1,
Ξ(h+ h˜)− Ξ(h) = DΞ(h; h˜) +RΞ(h; h˜),
where
DΞ(h; h˜) =[ΨΠ(h)]−1DΨΠ(h; h˜)[ΨΠ(h)]−1Ψx(l)(h)
+ [ΨΠ(h)]−1DΨx(l)(h; h˜),
and
‖DΞ(h; h˜)‖1≤ a1‖h˜‖1, and ‖RΞ(h; h˜)‖1≤ a1‖h˜‖21.
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When hˆ = h+ h˜, Assumptions 3(i)(iii)(iv) together with Lemma B.3 in Newey (1994) imply
that ‖hˆ−h‖1= Op(
√
ln(n)/(nhkω+2n )+hsn). By Assumption 3(iv),
√
nhkω+2n (
√
ln(n)/(nhkω+2n )+
hsn)2 → 0. Therefore, since |Rϕω(h, ω; hˆ−h)| ≤ a‖hˆ−h‖21, it follows that
√
nhkω+2n Rϕω(h, ω; hˆ−
h) = op(1). Therefore,
√
nhkω+2n RΞ(h; h˜) = op(1) and
√
nhkω+2n
(
Ξ(hˆ)− Ξ(h)
)
=
√
nhkω+2n DΞ(h; h˜) +
√
nhkω+2n RΞ(h; h˜)
=
√
nhkω+2n DΞ(h; h˜) + op(1).
For any j, j ′ = 1, . . . , J , define the following 2J×2J matrices: r1, r1,yj , r1,wj , rj
′
2 , rj
′
2,yj , and
rj
′
2,wj . Let r1 denote the matrix whose j − th row is equal to −
∂h
j
2(ω
(1))
∂(y,w) h1(ω
(1))+2 ∂h1(ω
(1))
∂(y,w) h
j
2(ω(1))
[h1(ω(1))]3
and (j + J)− th row is equal to −
∂h
j
2(ω
(2))
∂(y,w) h1(ω
(2))+2 ∂h1(ω
(2))
∂(y,w) h
j
2(ω(2))
[h1(ω(2))]3 . Let r1,yj denote the matrix
whose j−th column is equal to−
[
h12(ω(1))
[h1(ω(1))]2 · · ·
hJ2 (ω(1))
[h1(ω(1))]2
h12(ω(2))
[h1(ω(2))]2 · · ·
hJ2 (ω(2))
[h1(ω(2))]2
]′
and the
other entries are equal to zeros. Let r1,wj denote the matrix whose (j+J)−th column is equal
to −
[
h12(ω(1))
[h1(ω(1))]2 · · ·
hJ2 (ω(1))
[h1(ω(1))]2
h12(ω(2))
[h1(ω(2))]2 · · ·
hJ2 (ω(2))
[h1(ω(2))]2
]′
and the other entries are equal to
zeros. Let rj
′
2 denote the matrix whose j
′ − th row is equal to −
∂h1(ω
(1))
∂(y,w)
[h1(ω(1))]2 , (j
′ + J) − th
row is equal to −
∂h1(ω
(2))
∂(y,w)
[h1(ω(2))]2 , and the other entries are equal to zeros. Let r
j
′
2,yj denote the
matrix whose (j ′ , j) element is equal to 1
h1(ω(1)) , (j
′ + J, j) element is equal to 1
h1(ω(2)) , and
the other entries are equal to zeros. Let rj
′
2,wj denote the matrix whose (j
′
, j + J) element is
equal to 1
h1(ω(1)) , (j
′ + J, j + J) element is equal to 1
h1(ω(2)) , and the other entries are equal
to zeros. We also define the following 2J × 1 vectors: r˜1, r˜1,x(l) , r˜j
′
2 , and r˜j
′
2,x(l) . Let r˜1 be
the vector whose j − th element is −
∂h
j
2(ω
(1))
∂x(l)
h1(ω(1))+2 ∂h1(ω
(1))
∂x(l)
hj2(ω(1))
[h1(ω(1))]3 and (j + J)− th element
is −
∂h
j
2(ω
(2))
∂x(l)
h1(ω(2))+2 ∂h1(ω
(2))
∂x(l)
hj2(ω(2))
[h1(ω(2))]3 . Let r˜1,x(l) be the vector whose j − th element is equal to
− hj2(ω(1))[h1(ω(1))]2 and (j + J)− th element is equal to −
hj2(ω(2))
[h1(ω(2))]2 . Let r˜
j
′
2 denote the vector whose
j
′ − th and (j ′ + J) − th elements are equal to −
∂h1(ω
(1))
∂x(l)
[h1(ω(1))]2 and −
∂h1(ω
(2))
∂x(l)
[h1(ω(2))]2 , respectively, and
the other entries are equal to zeros. Let r˜j
′
2,x(l) be the vector whose j
′ − th and (j ′ + J)− th
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elements are equal to 1
h1(ω(1)) and
1
h1(ω(2)) , respectively, and the other entries are equal to
zeros.
For any j, j ′ = 1, . . . , J , define the following 2J × 1 vectors
Γ1 = Π−1r1Π−1Tx(l) + Π−1r˜1, Γ1,yj = Π−1r
j
′
1,yjΠ
−1Tx(l), (1.40)
Γ1,wj = Π−1r
j
′
1,wjΠ
−1Tx(l), ,Γ1,x(l) = Π
−1r˜1,x(l) , (1.41)
Γj
′
2 = Π−1rj
′
2 Π−1Tx(l) + Π−1r˜j
′
2 , ,Γj
′
2,yj = Π
−1rj
′
2,yjΠ
−1Tx(l), (1.42)
Γj
′
2,wj = Π
−1rj
′
2,wjΠ
−1Tx(l), ,Γj
′
2,x(l) = Π
−1r˜j
′
2,x(l) . (1.43)
Further define
Γ¯1 =
[
Γ1 Γ1,y1 · · · Γ1,yJ Γ1,w1 · · · Γ1,wJ Γ1,x(l)
]
, and (1.44)
Γ¯j2 =
[
Γj2 Γj2,y1 · · · Γj2,yJ Γj2,w1 · · · Γj2,wJ Γj2,x(l)
]
. (1.45)
Define the 2J × (2J + 2)(J + 1) matrix
Γ =
[
Γ¯1 Γ¯12 · · · Γ¯J2
]
. (1.46)
Define K˜(ω) = (K(ω), ∂K(ω)
∂y1
, . . . , ∂K(ω)
∂yJ
, ∂K(ω)
∂w1
, . . . , ∂K(ω)
∂wJ
, ∂K(ω)
∂x(l)
)′ .
Let Σ(ω) =

1 σ1(ω) · · · · · · σJ(ω)
σ1(ω) σ1(ω) 0 · · · 0
... 0 σ2(ω) · · · 0
... ... ... . . . ...
σJ(ω) 0 0 · · · σJ(ω)

.
Let
V = Γ[Σ(ω)⊗
∫
K˜(ω˜)K˜(ω˜)′dω˜]Γ′ . (1.47)
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and let
Vˆ = pˆi(ω)′ [Σˆ(ω)⊗
∫
K˜(ω˜)K˜(ω˜)′dω˜]pˆi(ω)
be an estimator for V , obtained by substituting h1 and hj2 by hˆ1 and hˆj2 respectively in
the definitions of r1, r1,yj , r1,wj , r
j
′
2 , rj
′
2,yj , r
j
′
2,wj , r˜1, r˜1,x(l) , r˜
j
′
2 , and r˜j
′
2,x(l) , respectively, and
substituting σj by σˆj, defined in (1.9), in the definition of Σ.
Assumptions 3(i)(ii) imply that Γ is bounded and continuous almost everywhere and zero
outside a compact set Ω. Assumption 2(ii) guarantees that σj is continuous a.e.. so Σ(ω)
is continuous a.e. In addition, for  > 0, sup
‖η‖<
(1 + σj(ω + η))f(ω + η) <∞ by Assumption
3(ii). Hence, Assumption 5.1 in Newey (1994) is satisfied. Assumptions 3(i)(iii) imply
that Assumptions K, H, and Y in Newey (1994) are also satisfied. Therefore, it follows by
Assumption 3(iv) and Lemma 3 in Newey (1994), by letting in that lemma, k1 = kω, k2 = 0,
and l = 1, that √
nhkω+2n DΞ(h; h˜)
d→ N(0, V ),
where V is defined in (1.47). Therefore,
√
nhkω+2n
(
Ξ(hˆ)− Ξ(h)
)
d→ N(0, V ). (1.48)
To show Vˆ is a consistent estimator for V , define the functional Υ corresponding to Γ.
Following similar arguments as those on ϕω(hj, ω) in Lemma 3, it can be shown that there
exists a constant c and functionals DΥ and RΥ such that
|Υ(hˆ, ω)−Υ(h, ω)| = |DΥ(h; hˆ− h) +RΥ(h; hˆ− h)|
≤ |DΥ(h; hˆ− h)|+ |RΥ(h; hˆ− h)|
≤ c‖hˆ− h‖1+c‖hˆ− h‖21.
Therefore, it follows from ‖hˆ − h‖1= op(1) that |Υ(hˆ, ω) − Υ(h, ω)| = op(1). This together
with the fact that |σˆj(ω)− σj(ω)| = op(1) implies that Vˆ p→ V .
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Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We first of all develop asymptotic normality for
√
ngˆn(θ0). For this purpose, we first
derive the asymptotic distribution for all the average derivative estimators in gˆn, denoted
by δ = (δ′1, . . . , δ
′
J)
′ . Here δj = E[∂f(ω)∂ωj mj] is the vector of expectation terms involved in the
moment condition gj(θ), where ωj = ω\z−j = (x′ , z′j, y1, . . . , yJ , w1, . . . , wJ).
By Assumptions 2(ii), 4, and 5, applying Theorem 3.3 in Powell et al. (1989), we have
√
n(δˆ − δ) d→ N(0,Σδ),
where Σδ = E[R(ω)R(ω)
′ ]−δδ′ andR(ω) =
(
R1(ω)
′
. . . RJ(ω)
′
)′
withRj(ω) = f(ω)∂σj(ω)∂ωj −
[mj − σj(ω)]∂f(ω)∂ωj .
Let T =

T1 0 · · · 0
0 T2 · · · 0
... ... . . . ...
0 0 · · · TJ

with Tj(θ) =
 Ikx 0kx×kzj −β ⊗ 11×J −α⊗ 11×J
0kzj×kx Ikzj −γ ⊗ 11×J −ρ⊗ 11×J
.
Then g(θ) = T (θ)δ . By Delta Method,
√
n(gˆn(θ)− g(θ)) d→ N(0,Σg),
where Σg = TΣδT
′ .
Next we derive asymptotic distribution for my GMM estimator θˆ.
Obviously, gj(ω, θ) ==
mj ∂f(ω)∂x − β∑Jj=1mj ∂f(ω)∂yj − α∑Jj=1mj ∂f(ω)∂wj
mj
∂f(ω)
∂zj
− γmj ∂f(ω)∂yj − ρmj
∂f(ω)
∂wj
 is continuously
differentiable in each θ ∈ Θ. Assumption 6 (iii) guarantees that E[
∥∥∥∥g(ω, θ)∥∥∥∥2] < ∞ and
E[sup
θ∈Θ
∥∥∥∥∇θg(ω, θ)∥∥∥∥] <∞. In addition, given Assumption 6(i)(ii), all regularity conditions for
the asymptotic normality of GMM estimator are satisfied. Hence, we have
√
n(θˆ − θ0) d→ N(0,Σθ),
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where Σθ is given by (1.24).
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Chapter 2
Estimating Preferences in the U.S.
College Admissions under a Matching
Framework
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2.1 Introduction
In this paper, I estimate the preferences of the students and colleges in the U.S. college
admissions and conduct counterfactual analysis, based on the theoretical results in Chapter
1. The U.S. college admissions market is a decentralized market in the sense that students
directly apply to and receive offers from colleges without coordination of any centralized
clearinghouse. The solution I propose this paper is to recover the preferences only based on
matching outcomes.
To implement the empirical analysis, I apply the proposed semiparametric estimation
strategy in Chapter 1 to the data set on U.S. college admissions, primarily constructed
from High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09) and the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS). My estimation results indicate that net price (i.e., tuition
minus financial aid/scholarship) of attending college has a negative impact on student’s
preferences over colleges while student’s SES (e.g., family income and parental education)
has a positive effect on a student’s inclination to attend colleges. Furthermore, a student’s
ability as measured by test scores and a math ability index leads to a higher evaluation by
colleges. In the empirical estimation, the majority of effects are significant at the one percent
level and large in magnitude.
My first counterfactual experiment evaluates the welfare gains and losses in the decen-
tralized market relative to the centralized market under deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm,
a setting that does not involve strategic behaviors. In a decentralized market, students di-
rectly approach multiple colleges, and after receiving offers, decide which one to accept. In
a centralized market, students express preferences in the rank order lists, colleges submit
admission criteria, which determine students’ priority, after which an algorithm automati-
cally matches students and colleges.1 The U.S. is one of the few countries that has adopted
1Theoretically, if the students are rational, these two markets should generate the same results when the
number of students is large due to the uniqueness of equilibrium shown by Azevedo and Leshno (2016).
However, this is not the case in reality since students may have different degrees of "sophistication". For
example, Hoxby and Avery (2013) discussed a puzzling phenomenon that a large number of low-income high
achievers do not apply to any selective college even when the cost of attending selective college is lower
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a decentralized college admissions process while many countries use centralized mechanisms
to match students with colleges. I find that overall, average welfare is similar in the two
markets. However, compared with the centralized market, average welfare for high-SES and
high-ability students is greater in the decentralized market by $5,289 and $11,767, respec-
tively, while average welfare for first-generation college students and low-ability students is
lower in the decentralized market by $1,333 and $1,578, respectively. These patterns are
consistent with the previous findings that high-SES students benefit from the uncoordinated
market relative to a coordinated one (Hemphill et al., 2009; Abdulkadiroğlu, Agarwal, and
Pathak, 2017).
The second counterfactual experiment accesses the welfare change of eliminating the
SAT score from the evaluation process. My finding suggests that average welfare loss of
eliminating SAT is small; however, students with highly-educated parents and high SAT
scores suffer non-negligible welfare losses.
Contributions to the Literature
This paper relates to studies on the college market in an equilibrium framework. Epple,
Romano, and Sieg (2006) and Epple et al. (2017) develop and estimate general equilibrium
models that characterize equilibrium policies. In Epple et al. (2017), by choosing admission
and financial aid policies, private college maximizes college quality, which depends on the
average student ability and educational resources provided to students, while public college
maximizes the aggregate achievement of in-state students. Fu (2014) develops and estimates
a structural subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) model, where students face uncer-
tainty and bear application costs when making application decisions. My model considers
matching between students and colleges based on their preferences, taking tuition and finan-
cial aid policies as given. It simplifies the application decisions of students and focuses on
the college’s admission decision and students’ enrollment decisions. An implicit assumption
than that of non-selective colleges. In the counterfactual analysis, I quantify the differences between the two
markets caused by student’s different degrees of sophistication and ability to make decisions.
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is that the application cost is zero. This assumption is in line with Epple, Romano, and Sieg
(2006) and Epple et al. (2017). My model adds to the literature by allowing for unobserved
heterogeneity in college preference and by not specifying the joint distribution of colleges’
unobserved error terms, while Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006), Fu (2014), and Epple et al.
(2017) assume away the unobserved college preference. My model, for example, covers the
scenario in which colleges value the quality of students’ essays or interviews, which are not
observed by the econometrician. Also, the preference over students’ essays may be correlated
across colleges.
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies the welfare effects of various
allocation mechanisms (Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003; Che and Koh, 2016; Abdulka-
diroğlu, Agarwal, and Pathak, 2017; Liu, Wan, and Yang, 2018). It provides empirical
evidence on whether a decentralized system will cause welfare gains or losses, and how gains
or losses are distributed across participants. The literature on such evidence is remarkably
small, partly because it is challenging to develop a framework of decentralized market where
the allocation process is hard to observe. Abdulkadiroğlu, Agarwal, and Pathak (2017) and
Liu, Wan, and Yang (2018) also quantify the welfare implications of decentralized markets.
Abdulkadiroğlu, Agarwal, and Pathak (2017) use data on the reform of the New York City
public high school assignment system and find that the transition from an uncoordinated
market to a coordinated market significantly improved average student welfare. Liu, Wan,
and Yang (2018) use data from a ride-sharing platform in China and find that centralized
algorithms can improve welfare by increasing both the match quality and the number of
matches. This paper adds to this literature by investigating the welfare consequences of the
U.S. college admissions system.
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2.2 The Specification
To implement the empirical analysis, I consider the following specification
uij = βx1i + γzij − dij + ij
vji = αx2i + SATi + ηji.
Here, uij is the utility of student i over college j, and vji is the utility of college j over student
i. xi1 includes student i’s family income and parental education. zij includes net tuition
paid by student i to college j as a cost measure and college j’s SAT 25th percentile score
as a quality measure.2 x2i includes high school GPA and a math ability index. Specifically,
the math ability index is a score constructed by the High School Longitudinal Study of
2009 (HSLS:09) and represents the probability that a student would pass a given proficiency
level.3 I use this variable to capture student’s logic thinking ability and to serve as a proxy
for ability to make decisions. The variables dij and SATi act as exclusive regressors; dij
is the distance between student i’s home (as proxied by her high school) and college j.
Distance is assumed to influence the demand of a student on colleges without affecting their
choice sets. SATi leads to variations in the choice set of students without changing student
preferences.4 The idea is similar to exploiting exclusion restrictions in simultaneous equation
model and isolating variation in each side of the market.5 The coefficient of dij is normalized
to −1 so that β and γ are measured in terms of willingness to travel. The normalization
of the coefficient of SATi to 1 implies that α measures the importance of the other ability
2The most common measure of quality in the literature is the median SAT score (Dale and Krueger,
2002; Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg, 1999; Terry Long, 2004). IPEDS provides the 25th and 75th percentile
SAT score instead of the median SAT score. My results are robust to using the 75th percentile SAT as the
quality measure.
3There are seven levels of proficiency and the levels are hierarchical in the sense that mastery of a higher
level typically implies proficiency at the lower levels. I use the highest level in the analysis. The results are
robust when using other levels.
4Here the exclusive regressor SATi does not have to vary across colleges because all the observables in
college’s preferences are student-specific.
5Similarly, in his analysis of the medical match, Agarwal (2015) used the birth and medical school location,
median MCAT score, and log NIH funding of graduating medical school as exclusive regressors.
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determinants relative to SAT score. The coefficients of dij and SATi are scale normalized
because in general, the units of utility are not identified. ij refers to the unobserved taste
shock in student i’s preference over college j. The error term ηji refers to the unobserved
taste shock in college j’s preference over student i such as essays, recommendations, and
extracurriculars. Here the joint distribution of (i1, . . . , iJ , η1i, . . . , ηJi) is still assumed to be
fully nonparametric.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
The main data set is constructed using the High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 (HSLS:09)
and the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), both of which are col-
lected by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). HSLS:09 contains detailed
information for students who first enrolled in college in 2013 on applications, admissions,
financial aid, and high school transcript. IPEDS provides detailed information of the post-
secondary institutions over years and I use the characteristics of the colleges in 2012, when
students would have been applying/choosing a college. I also use Common Core of Data
(CCD) and Private School Universe Survey (PSS) to obtain zip codes of high schools. Table
2.1 and 2.2 shows the summary statistics of the colleges and students, respectively.6
I define net tuition, quality, and distance for each potential (student, college) pair in
the following ways. First, the student is assigned the in-state tuition if she is a resident of
the same state as the college; otherwise, she is assigned out-of-state tuition. To construct
net price, I subtract the reported or estimated amount of the scholarship or grant that the
student receives from the tuition.7 Second, I use 25th percentile SAT math score and 25th
percentile SAT reading score of the college’s student body to proxy the college’s quality.
6Since the tables involve restricted-use data, as requested by NCES, in all the tables, all sample size
numbers are rounded to the nearest ten.
7The amount of scholarships and grants was subtracted if it was reported; otherwise, if the student was
offered Pell grant, the average amount of Pell grant ($3,579) in 2013 was subtracted. In addition, if the
student was offered work-study funding, the average amount ($1,669) in 2013 was subtracted. As we do not
observe whether the reported amount of scholarships and grants was offered by federal financial aid or the
enrolled college, I assume that the reported amount does not vary with college for each student.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of College Characteristics
Mean Sd Median N
Public (0/1) 0.4 0.49 0 870
Elite (0/1) 0.09 0.29 0 870
In-state tuition 20,685 13,254 22,266 870
Out-of-state tuition 25,027 9,837 24,468 870
SAT 25th percentile score
Critical reading 495.51 63.51 480 760
Math 507.2 67.42 490 760
Region
South (0/1) 0.33 0.47 0 870
West (0/1) 0.12 0.33 0 870
Northeast (0/1) 0.28 0.45 0 870
Midwest (0/1) 0.27 0.45 0 870
The definition of elite colleges follows Fu (2014). Based on U.S. News and World
Report from 2012, the top 30 private universities, top 20 liberal arts colleges, and
the top 30 public universities are considered as elite colleges. As requested by NCES,
in all the tables, all sample size numbers are rounded to the nearest ten.
To reflect the assortative matching between student’s interest of study and college quality,
instead of using the sum of the two 25th percentile scores, I weight each 25th percentile score
by student’s relative advantage of the subject. Specifically, the weight on college SAT math
score is defined as the ratio of the student’s high school math GPA percentile rank over the
sum of the student’s high school math GPA percentile rank and English GPA percentile rank,
and similar for the weight on college SAT reading score. Third, distance is constructed using
the zip codes (centroid) of student’s high school and the college. HSLS:09 also provides which
college the student is enrolled as of November 1, 2013. I use this information to generate
the matching outcome of the market.
Because the first step of my semiparametric method is kernel estimation of the density
function, it suffers from the curse of dimensionality as a nonparametric estimation approach.
In the equilibrium model, the matching outcome of any college depends on all the colleges’
characteristics. Therefore, the dimension of covariates is a multiple of the number of colleges,
leading to severe curse of dimensionality when there are many colleges. I reduce the dimen-
sionality of the covariates in the kernel function in three ways. First, I treat non-selective
colleges as the outside option and only consider selective colleges as alternatives. Second,
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Student Characteristics
Mean Sd N
Female (0/1) 0.53 0.5 13,940
Family income 89,947 71,700 13,390
Parent’s years of schooling 15.99 3.53 13,780
Composite SAT 1,030.46 200.83 7,240
High school GPA 2.99 0.69 13,290
Math ability index 0.04 0.09 13,280
Number of postsecondary
institutions applied
3.11 2.82 13,940
Enrolled (0/1) 0.87 0.34 13,940
Enrolled in selective college (0/1) 0.48 0.5 13,940
Scholarship 11,546 18,656 6,010
Work study (0/1) 0.24 0.42 10,070
Pell grant (0/1) 0.5 0.5 10,330
Sample includes the students who applied to at least one college. Composite SAT
is defined as the sum of actual math score and critical reading score where available;
otherwise was predicted using the student’s high school math GPA, English GPA,
gender, race, and ethnicity. Math ability index is defined as the math proficiency
probability score, which represents the probability that a student would pass a given
proficiency level. Selectivity of college is defined according to Carnegie Classification
of Institutions of Higher Education. As requested by NCES, in all the tables, all
sample size numbers are rounded to the nearest ten.
in the moment conditions, I integrate out "irrelevant" variables in the same way as in the
simulations. Third, I aggregate the colleges into groups and treat these groups as alterna-
tives. The aggregation is necessary also because a large fraction of colleges in the data are
matched to very few students (the distribution of the number of matched students across
colleges is shown in Figure 2.1). I aggregate colleges by public/private, elite/nonelite, and
region.8 I obtain 16 groups when the region is divided by south/west/northeast/midwest. I
also consider an alternative finer division of region: if the total enrollment in a state is over
200 in the data, I treat this state as a regional group; I then aggregate the remaining states
according to south/west/northeast/midwest as four other regional groups. In this way, I
obtain 59 groups.
8The definition of elite colleges follows Fu (2014). Based on U.S. News and World Report from 2012, the
top 30 private universities, top 20 liberal arts colleges, and the top 30 public universities are considered as
elite colleges.
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Figure 2.1: The distribution of college’s number of matched students
2.4 Estimation Results
Table 2.3 shows the estimation results for each aggregation scheme. Under the aggregation
scheme with 16 college bins, all the variables except for college SAT 25th percentile score
are significant at the one percent level. Recall that the coefficients of a student’s preferences
are measured in terms of willingness to travel. In magnitude, an increase of $1, 000 in net
price will lead to a decrease in a student’s utility that is equivalent to attending university 90
miles further away from home – about 43% of the mean distance traveled by students in the
data.9 An increase of $1, 000 in family income will lead to an increase in a student’s utility
that is equivalent to attending university 67 miles closer to home – about 32% of the mean
distance traveled by students in the data. One additional year of parental schooling increases
student’s utility by an amount that is equivalent to attending college 1,320 miles closer to
home, six times the mean of distance traveled by students in the data. As for the college’s
utility, the coefficients are measured relative to SAT score. A one-point increase in GPA
(i.e., 25% increase relative to the full score) is equivalent to an increase of SAT score by 295
9As a reference, distance to actual assignments has mean 207 miles, median 85 miles, and standard
deviation 385 miles in the data.
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Table 2.3: Preference Parameters
16 colleges 59 colleges
Coefficients Std. Error Coefficients Std. Error
Student’s utility
Net price -0.090*** 0.006 -0.044*** 0.003
College 25th
percentile SAT score
-0.079 0.462 0.634* 0.362
Family Income 0.067*** 0.002 – –
Parent’s years of
schooling
1320*** 57 – –
College’s utility
High school GPA 295*** 37 60** 23
Math ability index 5040*** 326 3510*** 322
N 11,680 11,680
Significance levels indicated by ∗p < .10; ∗ ∗ p < .05; ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01. Since the tables involve restricted-use
data, as requested by NCES, in all the tables, all sample size numbers are rounded to the nearest ten.
points (i.e., 18% increase relative to the full score). An increase in the probability of passing
a math proficiency test by 10% is equivalent to an increase of SAT score by 504 points (i.e.,
32% increase relative to the full score). Using the alternative way of aggregating the colleges
into 59 groups, I obtain estimates that show similar patterns, although the magnitude of
the coefficients is smaller than that in the first aggregation scheme. It is worth noting that
in the second aggregation scheme, college quality now has a significantly positive impact
on student’s utility. A 100-point increase of college SAT 25th percentile score leads to an
increase in student’s utility that is equivalent to attending college 63 miles closer to home
– about 30% of the mean distance traveled by the students. Estimates for student-specific
attributes in the second scheme are not calculated because they involve estimating kernel
functions with 60 covariates, an exercise which is not computationally feasible given the
sample size.
2.5 Welfare Analysis
To compute welfare measures and conduct counterfactual analysis, I first estimate the dis-
tribution of the unobserved terms. Although I have proven the nonparametric identification
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of the joint distribution of the unobserved terms in previous section, to facilitate estimation,
here I make some parametric assumptions. Assume ij = σ˜ij, where ˜ij follows i.i.d. ex-
treme type I distribution, and ηji = λi + η˜ji, where λi follows the normal distribution with
zero mean and variance σ2λ, and η˜ji follows the standard normal distribution.10 I further
assume that ˜ij, λi, and η˜ji are independent. I estimate (σ, σλ) by minimizing the distance
between the observed probabilities and the predicted probabilities of being matched with
each college, treating the cutoffs as auxiliary parameters.
2.5.1 Decentralized vs. Centralized Markets
Because individual student utility is not directly observed, I compute the expectation of the
utility for each student given by
E[uim(i)|x1i, x2i, zij, dij, SATi].
For the counterfactual centralized market, the expectation is estimated based on the
predicted matching outcomes under the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm using simulated
i and ηi.11 Average student welfare is defined as the average of the expected utilities that
students derive from their assignment (indirect utilities). The DA algorithm requires that
both students and colleges submit their rank order list or priority index as inputs. The
algorithm will obtain a stable matching after several iterations and will assign to each student
at most one college. The centralized market under DA algorithm provides a benchmark
where students do not have to engage in strategic behavior. Therefore, the ability to make
decisions, as proxied by math ability index, would not play a role in the centralized market.
For the decentralized market, the expectation is calculated based on the predicted match-
ing outcomes given estimated cutoffs using simulated i and ηi. Table 2.4 displays the differ-
10In most of the literature on logit discrete choice, σ is normalized to 1 as a scale normalization. In
the model, since I already assume the coefficient of distance to be -1, I do not make any normalization
assumption on σ.
11See appendix for a description of the DA algorithm.
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ence in student welfare between the decentralized market and the centralized market for all
students and for subgroups by gender, race, ethnicity, SES, and ability. The first and second
columns report the difference in average student welfare measured in miles and in dollars,
respectively. A positive value means higher welfare in the decentralized market than in the
centralized one. The third column shows the total welfare change for the entire cohort (1.66
million students) who took SAT in 2012. Overall, average student welfare is similar between
the decentralized market and the centralized market. Welfare change differs by race and
ethnicity. Relative to the centralized market, Asians gain by 523 miles in the decentralized
market while Blacks and Hispanics lose by 174 miles and 98 miles; welfare change is much
smaller for whites than for non-whites.12 These differences by race or ethnicity may be due
to SES, culture, and other social norms. Regarding SES, students whose parents both have
bachelor’s degrees and who themselves have a high SAT score considerably gain (by 476 miles
and 1,059 miles) while students with no parent ever going to college and with low SAT score
lose (by 120 miles and 142 miles) in the decentralized market relative to the centralized
market. These patterns are consistent with the previous findings that high-SES students
benefit from the uncoordinated market relative to a coordinated one (Hemphill et al., 2009;
Abdulkadiroğlu, Agarwal, and Pathak, 2017).
In Table 6, I turn to a multivariate analysis to address the importance of demograph-
ics, SES, and high school assistance in college preparation. Column (1) in Table 6 includes
basic demographics such as gender, race, and ethnicity. The results are consistent with the
descriptive statistics in Table 2.4. In column (2), I add indicators for whether mother or
father has a bachelor’s degree and a measure of family income. All the SES variables have
significantly positive impacts on student’s welfare in the decentralized market, relative to the
centralized DA counterfactual. This result might indicate that parents who attended college
are more familiar with the application process and can help their children make more sophis-
ticated decisions or improve their application relative to those who did not. Alternatively,
12The actual distance traveled in the data has mean 207 miles, median 85 miles, and standard deviation
385 miles.
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Table 2.4: Difference in Welfare: Decentralized - Centralized (DA)
Change in average welfare Change of the
entire cohort
Unit: (miles) (dollars) (billion dollars)
All 49 544 0.90
Female -19 -211 -0.19
Male 126 1,400 1.07
Asian 523 5,811 1.25
Black -174 -1,933 -0.45
Hispanic -98 -1,089 -0.25
White 11 122 0.15
Low income -78 -867 -0.40
High income 175 1,944 2.29
Parents with
bachelor’s degree
Both 476 5,289 1.84
Only mother -21 -233 -0.15
Only father 48 533 0.29
Neither -120 -1,333 -1.11
High ability
(SAT>1200)
1,059 11,767 6.25
Low ability
(SAT<=1200)
-142 -1,578 -1.78
Low income equals to one if the student’s family was at/above or below 185% of the 2012 poverty
threshold, as set forth by the U.S. Census Bureau; and zero, otherwise. Both family income and house-
hold size are considered when calculating whether a family is at/above or below 185% of the poverty
threshold. High income equals to one if the student’s family income in 2012 was above the median in
the data; and zero otherwise.
high-SES students have access to better high schools and more resources to facilitate their
college application process than low-SES students. Furthermore, when the SES variables
are included, the difference in welfare change between Black (Hispanic) and White students
decline by 43% (82%) in absolute value, implying that SES variables explain a considerate
fraction of the race and ethnicity effects. In column (3), I add two variables measuring the
assistance provided by the high school with regard to college preparation — whether the high
school’s counseling staffs spent over 50% of working hours in assisting students with college
readiness, selection, and applications, and the fraction of 11th and 12th grade students in
the high school who were helped with selecting colleges. Although I cannot directly observe
whether a particular student is offered counseling or information, the higher the percentage
66
at the high school who are offered counseling service, the more likely it is that any particular
student would have received help directly or benefited indirectly from these services through
spillovers from their peers. I find that only the assistance with college selection is significantly
correlated with the welfare difference. In column (4), by adding interaction between parental
education and high school assistance, I find that mother’s education and high school assis-
tance are complementary to each other. This finding implies that college-educated parents
could help their child make better use of high school assistance.
2.5.2 Eliminating SAT
An on-going debate in higher education has been about how much weight SAT and ACT
scores should be given in the admission process. A growing number of colleges, including
some highly selective colleges such as the university of Chicago, no longer mandate SAT or
ACT score submissions in college admission process.13 While proposals for dropping these
standardized test stands typically on reducing costs for low-income families, its potential
consequences to other groups of students merits examination as well.
I compare average student welfare by simulations under the DA mechanisms, with and
without SAT score in the admission process. Table 2.6 displays welfare change induced by
eliminating SAT score from the admission process. The first and second columns in Table
2.6 report the change in average student welfare measured in miles and dollars. The third
column shows total welfare change of the cohort (1.66 million students) who took SAT in
2012. A negative value implies a welfare loss by eliminating SAT. Overall, average welfare
loss is small. But the change differs by group. High-ability and high-SES students suffer a
welfare loss when SAT is not required in the admissions process and total welfare loss for
these advantaged groups amounts to 0.5 to 2 billion dollars. On the one hand, my finding
supports the argument of the policy’s advocates that colleges would attract and enroll more
underrepresented minority and low-income students by pursuing an optional SAT admissions
13A recent news can be found at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-university-
chicago-sat-act-20180614-story.html.
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Table 2.5: Welfare Change by Demographics, SES, and Information
Dep: W de −WDA (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -141.1*** -123.9*** -127.5*** -128.6***
(16.9) (16.5) (18.1) (18.1)
Asian 507.3*** 470.2*** 493.0*** 494.4***
(25.2) (24.7) (27.0) (26.9)
Black -206.5*** -118.5*** -129.5*** -127.1***
(24.5) (24.1) (27.7) (27.7)
Hisp -119.6*** -21.8 -24.9 -28.3
(24.7) (24.3) (26.9) (26.9)
Other -101.2 -37.8 -36.7 -40.1
(86.4) (84.2) (93.6) (93.5)
Mother w/ bachelor’s degree 151.8*** 155.2*** 10.5
(18.8) (20.7) (42.2)
Father w/ bachelor’s degree 233.7*** 243.4*** 150.6***
(20.0) (22.1) (44.4)
Family income 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HS counseling on college 24.1 -26.1
(32.0) (48.9)
HS college selection help 1.623*** 0.067
(0.313) (0.426)
HS counseling on college * mother w/
bachelor’s degree
62.1
(69.5)
HS college selection help * mother w/
bachelor’s degree
2.540***
(0.684)
HS counseling on college * father w/
bachelor’s degree
27.9
(69.8)
HS college selection help * father w/
bachelor’s degree
1.596**
(0.705)
Constant 103.6*** -180.3*** -250.8*** -162.6***
(13.9) (18.4) (24.6) (29.1)
Observations 11,610 11,610 9,980 9,980
R-squared 0.053 0.102 0.108 0.111
Significance levels indicated by ∗p < .10; ∗ ∗ p < .05; ∗ ∗ ∗p < .01. Since the tables involve restricted-use
data, as requested by NCES, in all the tables, all sample size numbers are rounded to the nearest ten. HS
counseling on college preparation equals to one if counseling staffs in the high school spent over 50% of work-
ing time on college readiness/selection/apply; and zero, otherwise. HS help with college selection is defined
by the percent of 11th/12th grade students in the high school who were helped with selecting colleges.
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Table 2.6: Change in Welfare by Eliminating SAT
Change in average welfare Change of the
entire cohort
Unit: (miles) (dollars) (billion dollars)
All -33 -367 -0.61
Female -16 -178 -0.16
Male -53 -589 -0.45
Asian -205 -2,278 -0.49
Black 169 1,878 0.44
Hispanic 112 1,244 0.29
White -48 -533 -0.66
Low income 79 878 0.41
High income -75 -833 -0.98
Parents with
bachelor’s degree
Both -255 -2,833 -0.99
Only mother -45 -500 -0.32
Only father -67 -744 -0.41
Neither 80 889 0.74
High ability
(SAT>1200)
-625 -6,944 -2.0
Low ability
(SAT<=1200)
59 656 0.90
Low income equals to one if the student’s family was at/above or below 185% of the 2012 poverty
threshold, as set forth by the U.S. Census Bureau; and zero, otherwise. Both family income and house-
hold size are considered when calculating whether a family is at/above or below 185% of the poverty
threshold. High income equals to one if the student’s family income in 2012 was above the median in
the data; and zero otherwise.
policy. On the other hand, my finding shows a more comprehensive picture by evaluating the
cost on students from high-SES family. Therefore, the impact of the policy is inconclusive,
pointing to a direction for future research.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyzed the U.S. college admissions and estimated the utility parameters of
students and colleges under a many-to-one matching framework. By doing so, I uncovered the
role of student’s family background, college costs, and college quality in student’s enrollment
decision. In addition, I estimated how student’s SAT score and high school gpa determine
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college’s admission decision. Based on the estimation results, I implemented and quantified
the welfare effects of two counterfactual experiments: i) experiment where a decentralized
market is switched to a centralized market; ii) experiment where the SAT score is eliminated
from the admission process. Furthermore, this framework can be used to evaluate the effects
of various policies such as expanding college capacity and increasing financial aid.
To further improve the model, I plan to work on the following three aspects. First, it is
necessary to provide evidence for the validity of the excluded regressors used in the paper
(i.e., distance between the student and the college and SAT score).
Second, I plan to investigate different specifications including interactions and discrete
random variables to consider important factors such as race and public/private college.
Third, at the current stage I only compared the student welfare between the decentralized
market and the centralized market through the channel of student’s degree of sophistication.
However, there are still some important channels that need to be explored.
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Chapter 3
Three Generations of Changing
Gender Patterns of Schooling in
China
71
3.1 Introduction
China has distinguished itself over the past several decades by its extremely rapid economic
growth and the accompanying sharp rise in literacy and in living standards. However, it is
also notable for the strong son preference that has led to one of the most imbalanced sex
ratios in the world. The most recent data puts the ratio at 1.15 boys to girls at birth and
1.17 boys to girls from 0-14 years old (The World Factbook, 2018). Son preference has been
a pronounced phenomenon for generations and is evident in several other countries as well.
(See Hesketh and Xing, 2006 for a discussion detailing sex ratios in Asia.)
Son preference has been attributed to numerous underlying cultural norms Das Gupta
et al. (2003) but is likely also due, at least in part, to economic factors. Parents who may
anticipate a need for old age support may prefer sons who not only have had a greater
earning potential than daughters, but who, given cultural norms, are more likely to live near
parents than are daughters who traditionally have lived nearer their husband’s family.
The strong son preference in China is manifested prior to birth in selective abortion and
other means of skewing the sex ratio at birth, and subsequently through higher mortality
rates for newborn daughters relative to sons. It can also manifest itself as children grow,
with fewer resources devoted to daughters than to sons. Studies have shown worse health
outcomes for girls over boys (Pande, 2003; Li, Zhu, and Feldman, 2004; Mishra, Roy, and
Retherford, 2004), less financial support (Lei et al., 2017), and less investment in schooling
(Kingdon, 2002; Wang, 2005; Song, Appleton, and Knight, 2006).
In addition to differences by gender, we focus our attention on differences in schooling
investments between rural and urban areas. Not only are economic conditions different across
regions, implying differing returns to education, but we might also expect the strength of
son preference and other attitudes towards sons and daughters to vary differentially between
the two areas as well.
In this paper we use data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study
(CHARLS) to analyze schooling attainment for three generations of Chinese men and women,
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giving us an unusually long view of changes in investments. While CHARLS is a panel study
of individuals ages 45 or older and their spouses, the survey also collects information on the
parents and children of these respondents. These generation data provide us the opportunity
to examine the time path of schooling investments for individual families and to control
for differences within families. We can look at intergenerational correlations in schooling
attainment for a full three generational dynasty.
In our work we look not just at time trends in completed schooling but attempt to
identify the importance of two key policies central to Chinese economic growth: compulsory
schooling laws and the enactment of China’s one child policy. The effects of these policies
are identified through the variation in timing for the roll-outs and the degree of enforcement
across geographic regions.
We find large differences in schooling by both region (urban or rural) and gender, but
these differences have decreased substantially over time–particularly those differences be-
tween the schooling attainment of males and females in urban areas. The gains in schooling
for females are large enough that, among the youngest in our sample, women have more
years of schooling, on average, than do young men. With respect to the public policy levers,
we find that compulsory schooling laws contributed significantly to the rise in schooling,
and did so to a greater extent in rural areas, and particularly for females in these areas.
Furthermore, the one child policy has had a significant effect on schooling for both boys and
girls, likely as parents increase the investment in children rather than attempt to divide that
investment across siblings. The lower total cost associated with raising one child rather than
several, also allows greater resources to be directed towards education. However, contrary to
expectations, we do not find differing effects of the one child policy for educational outcomes
for males and females.
In the following section we provide some background on son preference and on schooling
attainment. In section three we introduce our data set along with some descriptive statistics.
Section four provides our formal regression analysis and a final section offers our conclusions.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 Overview
China’s economic growth has indeed been rapid, averaging close to 10 percent per year
from 1989 to the present. Going back even further, the peak annual growth rate hit 19.3
percent in 1970 (numbers based on public data from the World Bank). This modernizing and
growing economy has meant more resources to finance education and more job opportunities
for educated individuals, particularly for women. A more educated populace, in turn, itself
contributes to economic growth. Another artifact of modernization, improved health and
the increasing life expectancy, accompanying economic growth provides for longer working
life and a longer length of time over which to reap returns to an investment in education.
And finally, modernization can bring with it changes in attitudes or preferences, particularly
the tradition of son preference, leading potentially to smaller biases in the distribution of
educational investments.
In addition to the effect of rising economic fortunes in China and increased employment
opportunities for women on schooling investments, educational attainment in China was also
likely affected by public policy. Compulsory schooling laws introduced by the government
beginning in 1986 mandated attendance through grade nine. These mandates would be
expected to have had a larger effect on schooling for girls than boys, since girls started at
lower levels of education. In providing a larger positive impact on female educational levels,
these laws ought to have reduced the difference in the schooling attainment of boys and girls.
Similarly, one might expect the effects of compulsory schooling to be larger in rural areas
where schooling levels were initially low.
Finally, the one-child policy may also have led not just to greater schooling investment
overall, but to a decline in the gap between the education of boys and girls. There are
several reasons to posit such an effect. First, as highlighted by Almond, Li, and Meng
(2014), with a limit on the number of children a family can have, parents with the strongest
74
son preferences may choose selective abortion or other means to ensure the birth of a son.
Thus, those families who do have a daughter would be less averse to investing in a girl and
thus more likely to provide her with greater levels of schooling. Second, with a single child,
parents have an incentive to invest heavily in that child regardless of gender, and even if
the "returns" to investing in a daughter are smaller than those of investing in a son, the
investment in schooling will likely yield positive returns. And finally, with fewer children to
support, parents can invest more in the schooling of all children. But daughters, starting at
a lower average level of schooling, have more potential for gain once financial constraints are
eased.
3.2.2 Schooling in China
In 1986 China instituted compulsory schooling requirements, mandating nine years of school-
ing for all children. Despite the laws, enrollment beyond primary grades remained far from
universal for some time. The China Education Research Network provides statistics indicat-
ing that in 1990, approximately 75 percent of those finishing primary school "graduated" to
middle school.1 While enrollments increased rapidly in the coming years, the children in our
sample were born before 1991 and thus attended primary schools well-before middle school
attendance was ubiquitous.
Unsurprisingly, schooling in rural areas has been far below that in urban areas (Connelly
and Zheng, 2003) and several factors likely come into play in explaining that difference. In
rural areas the opportunity cost of sending a child to school is likely larger because the
child could provide labor for the family. Conversely, the returns to schooling are lower in
rural areas so the cost of foregoing a middle school education is lower. The "cost" of getting
to school in terms of distance traveled / difficulty is also larger in rural areas, reducing
attendance (Li and Liu, 2014). And the burden of paying associated school fees and the cost
of books may be felt more strongly in rural areas where incomes are lower.2
1http://www.edu.cn/gai_kuang_495/20100121/t20100121_441886.shtml.
2Reforms enacted in 2001 through 2006 puts limits on the amount of tuition and fees that could be
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3.3 Data
3.3.1 Description of CHARLS
Our data come from the Chinese Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study or CHARLS.
CHARLS is a longitudinal survey that is nationally representative of the non-institutionalized
Chinese population 45 years old or older and their spouses. The first wave of the survey was
fielded in 2011 with follow-up waves in 2013 and 2015 and continuing on a biennial basis.
CHARLS is part of a set of "sister surveys" established across a large number of countries,
with the respondent populations in all cases, focused on those approaching retirement. These
related studies include the Health and Retirement Study in the United States (HRS), the
Japanese Survey of Aging and Retirement (JSTAR), the Korean Longitudinal Study of Aging
(KLOSA), the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), and the Survey of Health,
Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) among others.3 The surveys interview both
respondents and their spouses obtaining information on income, wealth, health and family
relationships.
The initial interview round of CHARLS, undertaken in 2001, surveyed 17,587 individuals
in 10,257 households. There are 8,436 males and 9,151 females in this initial waves, with
the larger number of women due to differential mortality at older ages.4 We draw our data
primarily from the second wave of the survey in which a total of 18,605 respondents were
interviewed.
Our study is focused on trends in schooling and the role of public policies instituted
in the later part of the last century in affecting that change. The key policies we analyze
are the one child policy and compulsory schooling laws, both of which were implemented
charged and allowed for financial assistance. See Chyi and Zhou (2014) for a discussion of the impact of
these reforms.
3Other related surveys are the Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing (TILDA), the Mexican Health and
Aging Study (MHAS), the Longitudinal Aging Study in India (LASI), and the Study on Global Ageing and
Adult Health (SAGE).
4Despite the skewed sex ratio at birth currently, the sex ratio at birth in 1962 was estimated to be 107
boys for every 100 girls–approximately what is expected naturally. (World Bank, 2018)
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approximately 30 to 40 years ago. To this end, we construct our analytic sample to focus
primarily on the children of our respondents. With parents averaging 60 years old when
the survey began, their children were born in precisely the time period most affected by the
changes. In fact, the average birth year of the children in our sample is 1977, just prior
to the establishment of the one child policy. In addition to these children, we also include
the respondents themselves as well as the parents of the respondents (the grandparents of
those on whom we focus). While many of these grandparents have already died, the survey
collected schooling information and birth year for deceased grandparents so we can thus
include them in our analysis of schooling attainments over time.
The use of these data, for three generations of the same family, is a key way in which our
study differs from others examining schooling in China. Not only do we have schooling for
three generations in the same family, but at the child level, we have schooling for (typically)
all children in the family.5 We can thus look at differences in schooling attainment holding
constant family fixed effects. In doing so when focusing on the child generation, we are
implicitly examining differences between brothers and sisters within the same family. We can
thus assess the importance of gender, holding constant factors such as familial resources or
attitudes towards schooling–measures which may be correlated with educational attainment
and with the gender composition of the family-leading to biased results.
Both the parents and grandparents in our sample (i.e. the respondents and spouses in
CHARLS and their own parents) are well beyond the age at which individuals are likely
to be enrolled in school, so the initial reports of educational attainment are an accurate
measure of completed schooling. However, at the start of the survey, a substantial fraction
of children of the respondents are young enough that they are still accumulating years of
schooling. We therefore impose an age cutoff for children, and choose age 22. Furthermore,
to ensure that we have as large a sample as possible of those in this generation who are 22
years old or older, we use observations on schooling as measured in the second wave of the
5We limit our sample to children 22 years old or older so in some families we will omit younger siblings.
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survey–the most recent data available. In doing so, we are providing these children with the
potential for two additional years to age and to finish their education relative to schooling
as reported in wave 1. Our age cutoff of 22 is thus based on age in wave 2, corresponding to
the year 2013. These "children" thus were born in 1991 or earlier. Because our top education
category is "some college or more" even those children who are still attending college at age
22 will be denoted as having achieved some college, so their "final" level of schooling in our
classification scheme will not change in subsequent waves. It is unlikely that many of those
22 years old or older who have not previously attended college will return to school later
in the survey. (Nor will those age 22 or older return to complete primary school, middle
school, or high school.) With these restrictions we are left with a sample of 9,751 families
with 27,306 children. Excluding families with zero household weight leaves 26,798 children
in 9,558 families.
3.3.2 Descriptive Characteristics of Sample
Descriptive statistics for our sample are presented in table 3.1. Here we use one observation
per family and use values of time-varying variables as measured in 2013. Because of the
large differences between urban and rural areas in important measures such as schooling,
income, and the enforcement of the one-child policy, we also report the means separately by
the urban/rural status of the respondent household. The two rightmost columns of the table
report these means. For this table wherein we measure variables on the household level, we
define rural or urban based on the location of the primary respondent at the time of the
interview. We note that given China’s rapid industrialization, this location may be different
from the location of children or grandparents. It may also differ from the location of the
respondent at the time he or she was born or the time the children were born. Later in the
paper, when analyzing schooling on an individual level, we use the hukou of the individual’s
birth for each generation.
Seventy-two percent of our total sample is married; the mean birth year for the male
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Table 3.1: Weighted Summary Statistics of Family Characteristics
All Urban Rural
N= 9,558* N=3,680 N=5,600
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Married couple 0.72 (0.005) 0.72 (0.007) 0.73 (0.006)
Birth year of father 1952 (0.109) 1952 (0.179) 1952 (0.138)
Birth year of mother 1953 (0.109) 1953 (0.173) 1953 (0.142)
Number of Children 2.94 (0.016) 2.62 (0.025) 3.23 (0.021)
Only child 0.16 (0.004) 0.24 (0.007) 0.08 (0.004)
Number of Sons 1.53 (0.011) 1.33 (0.017) 1.71 (0.015)
Number of Daughters 1.41 (0.012) 1.29 (0.020) 1.52 (0.017)
Birth year of oldest child 1976 (0.108) 1976 (0.174) 1975 (0.141)
Birth year of youngest child 1981 (0.080) 1981 (0.131) 1981 (0.101)
Family income 35,694 (1011) 49,576 (1210) 24,411 (1467)
Years of Schooling
Grandfather (father’s
side)
2.02 (0.040) 2.65 (0.074) 1.47 (0.042)
Grandmother (father’s
side)
0.765 (0.026) 1.17 (0.052) 0.39 (0.022)
Grandfather (mother’s
side)
1.93 (0.038) 2.49 (0.071) 1.45 (0.040)
Grandmother (mother’s
side)
0.66 (0.024) 1.03 (0.050) 0.34 (0.020)
Father 6.80 (0.053) 8.09 (0.089) 5.70 (0.062)
Mother 4.11 (0.052) 5.82 (0.091) 2.68 (0.053)
Sons (within family
mean)
9.80 (0.044) 11.23 (0.070) 8.61 (0.052)
Daughters (within family
mean)
9.00 (0.054) 10.93 (0.079) 7.35 (0.064)
*Numbers differ across columns and variables due to missing values on some measures. Rural status is missing for 278
households.
respondents in the family (the fathers in our generational approach) is 1952, and for the
females (mothers) it is 1953. The mothers in our sample were thus, on average, 26 years old
in 1979 when the one child policy was established. Unsurprisingly given the sampling frame,
the birth years of respondents are identical across urban and rural regions.
The average number of children for the families in our sample is 2.94, a surprise to many
given the recent attention to China’s one child policy. Consistent with the well-documented
unequal gender ratios, there are more sons than daughters–1.53 to 1.41. Families with only
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one child are surprisingly rare, comprising just 16 percent of families in our sample. (This
fraction rises to 18 percent when including families with children under 22, demonstrating
the expected rise over time in the prevalence of one child families.)
It is when looking at these variables—variables pertaining to family size and composition—
we see large differences across rural and urban areas, providing our first indication that son
preference and investments in children might vary across regions. The average family size
in urban areas is 2.62 children compared to 3.23 in rural areas, consistent with the greater
costs of raising children in urban areas and the negative correlation typically found between
income and family size across countries. Similarly, only children are far more common in
urban areas, 0.24 versus 0.08, where not only are children more costly, but the one child
policy was more strictly enforced.
When looking at the gender of children, the son-bias appears to be far larger in rural
areas than urban areas. In urban areas there are 1.33 sons and 1.29 daughters, on average,
for a sex ratio of males to females of 1.031—actually a bit below what is considered normal—
compared to 1.71 sons and 1.52 daughters in rural areas with an implied sex ratio of 1.125
in rural areas.
We also see the expected differences in income across regions with household income in
urban areas being approximately twice that of rural areas.6
There has undoubtedly been a sharp rise in educational levels in China. To examine
the changes in schooling over time we stacked the data for all three generations of family
members to provide a person level (rather than family level) data set. Each respondent-
couple contributes two observations for themselves, four observations for their parents /
parents-in-law, and one observation for each child. An unmarried respondent contributes an
observation for herself, one for each of her parents, and one for each of her children. While the
respondent-based sample is population representative of individuals of the targeted cohort,
we note that this expanded person level sample is not population representative for the older
6While nearly all our data come from the publicly available data on the CHARLS website, our income
measure is that developed by the HRS Harmonization project and available from https://g2aging.org/.
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and younger cohorts. Nonetheless, we believe these data provide important information
regarding the correlates of schooling attainment and that our generational approach, using
three generations for a particular family, provides insights not otherwise attainable.
Using these data we examine years of schooling by birth year, gender, and rural/urban
status.7 We construct a single years of schooling measure based on 12 educational categories
reported in the survey (e.g. "did not finish primary school but capable of reading and
writing," "graduate from primary school", "graduate from middle school",. . . ) Appendix table
3.6 reports our cross-walk between categories and years of schooling.
Figure 3.1: Schooling by Birth Year
Figure 3.1 shows a dramatic and continued rise in schooling levels over time for the full
sample. The horizontal axis measures birth year of the individual and the vertical axis
measures schooling attainment in 2013 when the youngest in our sample are 22 years old.
7The measure of rural/urban differs marginally across generations. For children of the respondents and
the respondents themselves, we use their initial hukou. The hukou for grandparents is available only if the
grandparent is still alive. If we do not have this information because the grandparent has died or because
it is missing, we use, in order, whether the grandparent grew up in a rural area or currently lives in a rural
area. Absent either of these two measures, we impute urban/rural status based on the region of their child’s
hukou (the parent’s hukou in our terminology).
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Figure 3.2 shows this rise in schooling by gender and clearly demonstrates the convergence in
the educational attainment of males and females. Although difficult to discern in the figure,
the schooling level for women has not only caught up to that of men, but has begun to
surpass it. Despite changes like compulsory schooling laws and China’s one child policy, we
do not see dramatic breaks in trend for the 1979 or 1986 birth year cohorts in either figure.
However, we do see some indication of a decline in schooling for those born in the early
1950s, who would have been approaching middle school age during the Cultural Revolution
from 1966 to 1976.
Figure 3.2: Schooling by Birth Year and Gender
Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 repeat the analysis for rural and urban individuals. As shown
in figure 3.3, the rise in schooling levels was initially more rapid in urban areas (and given
our smaller number of observations, more noisy) but the two regions have risen roughly in
parallel for the past 30 or more years.
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Figure 3.3: Schooling by Birth Year and Residence
Figure 3.4: Schooling by Birth Year and Gender: Rural
Perhaps most interestingly, echoing the results in figure 3.2, the schooling attainment of
women has caught up (and somewhat surpassed) that for men, even in rural areas where son
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preference would be thought to be most entrenched.8 There was, however, a delayed conver-
gence in rural areas. While women in urban areas were achieving educational levels similar
to that of men for cohorts born as early as the mid-1950s, in rural areas this convergence
occurred approximately 20 years later.
Figure 3.5: Schooling by Birth Year and Gender: Urban
To assess these increases in schooling in more detail, we examine the distribution of com-
pleted schooling. Table 3.2 shows the level of schooling attained—none (illiterate), primary
school or less, middle school, high school, or college or above—for each cohort, and sepa-
rately by urban and rural status. We construct these categories from survey responses that
include much more detail (e.g. home schooling, literate but did not finish primary school,
and type of graduate degree). Appendix table 3.6 lists the originally reported schooling level.
As was apparent in the figures, the rise in educational attainment across three generations
is dramatic. Average schooling for urban individuals rose from 2.83 in the oldest cohort to
8Recall the hypothesis of Almond, Li, and Meng (2014) that given the sex selection possible before birth
and the one child policy, families with daughters may have less strong son preference, and thus greater
investments in those daughters.
84
Table 3.2: Patterns of Education Across Cohorts
Urban Hukou Rural Hukou
Male Female All Male Female All
Child cohort
Number of observations 1836 1635 3471 11,419 10,374 21,793
Average birth year 1974 1974 1974 1976 1976 1976
Years of schooling 12.28 12.45 12.36 8.58 7.46 8.04
Level / degree obtained
Illiterate (0/1) 0.44 0.87 0.65 2.89 10.09 6.35
Primary and below (0/1) 7.82 6.19 7.02 33.66 38.55 36.01
Middle School (0/1) 23.71 22.36 23.05 39.46 30.91 35.36
High School (0/1) 31.11 35.88 33.44 13.76 11.63 12.74
College and above (0/1) 36.91 34.71 35.84 10.23 8.81 9.55
Parent cohort
Number of observations 758 777 1535 5670 6521 12,191
Average birth year 1951 1953 1952 1952 1953 1953
Years of schooling 9.40 8.32 8.85 6.32 3.39 4.84
Level / degree obtained
Illiterate (0/1) 4.07 10.23 7.29 12.05 41.32 27.66
Primary and below (0/1) 23.84 23.28 23.55 46.78 37.80 41.99
Middle School (0/1) 29.72 28.38 29.02 26.09 15.18 20.27
High School (0/1) 32.66 29.41 30.96 12.77 5.10 8.68
College and above (0/1) 9.71 8.70 9.18 2.31 0.60 1.40
Grandparent cohort
Number of observations 1020 1821 2841 7947 13,597 21,544
Average birth year 1923 1924 1924 1922 1924 1923
Years of schooling 4.34 1.98 2.83 1.79 0.45 0.94
Level / degree obtained
Illiterate (0/1) 36.80 69.83 57.96 62.48 89.81 79.84
Primary and below (0/1) 39.20 19.34 26.48 30.66 8.81 16.78
Middle School (0/1) 7.99 4.89 6.00 4.20 0.95 2.14
High School (0/1) 10.55 470 6.80 2.14 0.42 1.05
College and above (0/1) 5.46 1.24 2.76 0.52 0.00 0.19
Note: Data for all three generations in a family are reported by the parent generation.
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12.36 in the most recent. The comparable numbers for rural status are from less than one
year of schooling to eight years.
When looking at the individual categories of schooling, it is particularly astonishing to see
the high rate of illiteracy prevalent among the oldest generation. The average year of birth
for grandparents is around 1923-1924 and yet nearly 60 percent of urban individuals and as
many as 80 percent of rural individuals were illiterate.9 By comparison, in the United States
in the 1920s, approximately 95 percent of adults were literate.10 (Note the United States’
statistic is for the population at that time, not the cohort born at that time who would be
expected to have even greater educational attainment.) Even at these extremely high rates
of illiteracy, women are disadvantaged. The illiteracy rate for rural women is 90(!) percent
compared to "just" 62 percent for men. And even among urban women, illiteracy is 70
percent, so urban women are less literate than even rural men. The educational achievement
in China is dramatically seen at this lowest level of education in that for the child generation,
illiteracy falls to well below 1 percent for urban children and to 6.35 percent rural children.
Also noteworthy is the increase at the highest level of schooling with over one-third of the
children in the urban sample now having at least some college education.11
The narrowing of the gender gap observed in the figures is even more visible in this
table. Among the grandparent generation, urban men had more than twice as many years
of schooling on average as did women, 4.34 versus 1.98. By the parental generation, women
had almost caught up with an average of 8.32 years of schooling compared to 9.4 for men.
For the most recent cohort, women had more schooling on average than men, 12.28 years for
men and 12.45 years for women—a phenomenon apparent throughout the developed world.
Change in rural areas has been slower. In the grandparent generation average years of
schooling for men was 4 times that of women, narrowing to just under 2 times for the parental
9Note that this sample is representative of parents of a representative sample of the Chinese population,
they are not themselves representative.
10https://ourworldindata.org/literacy/ (referenced October 20, 2017)
11To again draw a comparison with the United States, among those 25-44, 64 percent have some college
(Ryan and Bauman, 2016).
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Table 3.3: Correlations in schooling across generations
Son Daughter Mother Father Father’s
mother
Father’s
father
Mother’s
mother
Mother’s
father
Son 1.00 0.59 0.41 0.44 0.14 0.20 0.15 0.19
Daughter 1.00 0.51 0.48 0.19 0.25 0.20 0.23
Mother 1.00 0.43 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.29
Father 1.00 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.22
Father’s
mother
1.00 0.47 0.33 0.24
Father’s
father
1.00 0.27 0.33
Mother’s
mother
1.00 0.47
Mother’s
father
1.00
generation and to just 15 percent greater (8.58 versus 7.46) for the youngest cohort.
Our data are unique in that we have information on the schooling for three generations
within a family. We can therefore examine the extent to which there are within family corre-
lations across generations. Because of our interest in gender differences, we look separately
at correlations for sons/daughters, mothers/fathers, and grandfathers/grandmothers. Table
3.3 presents the results. We note that there are relatively large correlations across genera-
tions that as expected, decline with the distance between the generations. The correlation
between sons (daughters) and their mothers is 0.41 (0.51) and 0.44 (0.48) with fathers. It is
worth noting that the correlations with both parents are slightly higher for daughters than
sons. If we consider parental education to be a proxy for family income then it may suggest
that income is more important in determining a daughter’s educational attainment than a
son’s. Alternatively, greater schooling by parents may reflect a greater emphasis placed on
education, an emphasis that is more important for daughters who have traditionally been
short changed in this regard.
The correlations between the educational levels of children and their parents are uniformly
greater than those between parents and grandparents, with the correlation between a father
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(mother) and his (her) own mother at 0.18 (0.27), and 0.24 (0.29) with his (her) own father.
Again, the correlations are higher between women and their parents than for men and their
parents. Interestingly, we also see that correlations with the educational levels of one’s in-
laws are nearly identical to those of own parents, perhaps attesting to assortative mating or
to the similarity of educational levels within a particular locale.
Finally, with regard to within generational correlations, the correlations between married
couples in the parent generation (i.e. between mothers and fathers in our nomenclature) at
0.43 is quite similar to that between married couples one generation older, 0.47 for both
that between the husband’s parents and the wife’s parents. With respect to the children,
we note the correlation between brothers and sisters at 0.59 is similar to that found in the
United States and other countries for siblings more generally (not brothers and sisters). See
des Etangs-Levallois and Lefranc (2017) for a summary of the literature across European
countries and the United States.
3.3.3 Measurement of Key Variables
In order to assess the importance of compulsory schooling laws and the one child policy we
need good measures of the extent to which the policies were relevant for a particular child.
We thus construct two new variables, one for each policy, that summarize the impact. We
describe our efforts here. Because of the timing of these policy interventions, they are relevant
only for the schooling attainment of the most recent cohorts—those who were attending or
could have been attending school in the 1970s and 1980s or whose siblings may have done
so.
In 1986, China enacted a law mandating nine years of compulsory education for all
children. Given the existing schooling levels, this law primarily affected rural areas wherein
previous requirements were just four to six years of schooling. The law was rolled out
gradually across provinces beginning in the most economically advanced areas. Children were
subject to the law if they had not reached grade nine (the new required level of schooling)
88
at the time the law went into effect. We thus code our measure of compulsory schooling
to be specific to the child’s birth year and province.12 Within each province the law was
introduced gradually from more to less urban areas. We do not have information at this level
of detail and simply use the date at which the law first went into effect in each child’s home
province. In our regression analyses to follow, we interact this measure with an indicator of
urban or rural status to allow for differing effects in enforcement and implementation.
The second key policy change is the advent of China’s one child policy, enacted in 1979
and implemented in 1980. As with the compulsory schooling laws, enforcement varied across
regions.13 Later the government relaxed the requirement and allowed rural families to have
a second child if the first child was a girl or if both parents were only children.14
The impact of the one child policy depends primarily on the age of the mother and on
how her fertility was affected because of the law. She may have made a conscious decision
not to have a daughter through selective abortion, or may have altered the timing of the
pregnancy given that she would likely incur only one pregnancy. To capture the impact on
the mother and thus on the child, we use a measure of exposure to family planning regimes
similar to that constructed in Wang (no date) based on the fraction of a woman’s fertile years
spent under the one child policy.15 In examining the schooling of children in our sample, we
use the measure constructed based on the mother’s age. We also interact this measure with
a dummy variable for the gender of the child.
12The information was collected from Regulations of the Implementation of Compulsory Schooling Laws
of each province.
13The policy also affected only the Han majority. The Han population constitutes approximately 93
percent of our sample; nearly identical to the approximately 92 percent in China as a whole. We have
repeated all the analyses below with controls for ethnicity, but given the overwhelming fraction Han, our
conclusions are the same regardless of whether it is included. For parsimony we report results ignoring this
measure of ethnicity.
14Families could also have more than one child if they paid the fine associated with the additional child
or if children were born outside the country.
15Wang used the fraction of years under each of three different family planning regimes. We use only the
most recent as it is most relevant to our sample.
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3.4 Data analysis
The dramatic rise in schooling shown in our figures and in table 3.2 likely has many causes.
There has been widespread economic growth that has both made schooling more affordable
and that has raised the returns to schooling. Also in a transition from an agricultural
economy to a more urban economy, children are less needed to work the land and the
opportunity cost of schooling is thus lower.16 However, as discussed above, there have also
been changes in government policies that likely influenced schooling levels, most directly the
installation of compulsory schooling laws and more indirectly, the one child policy which,
among other effects, would have reduced competition for parental resources, and for girls,
reduced the probably that a brother would be favored.
3.4.1 Full sample
We begin with a standard regression equation for completed schooling using our stacked data
for all three generations:
Schoolingij = α0 + α1 X1ij + εij
Column (1) of table 3.4 reports the results for our most basic specification controlling for
gender, time, and whether the person has rural hukou. We measure time in terms of birth
year, centered at the birth year of the oldest individual in our sample (1852).17 The variable
thus increments by one for each year of birth beyond 1852 and for a child born in 1980,
would have a value of 118. Other variables are defined straightforwardly.
16Compulsory schooling laws outlawed the hiring of children younger than 15 although in rural areas such
employment likely continued to at least some extent.
17The birth years of the grandparent generation are reported by the respondents. While a grandparent
born so long ago appears to be unlikely, we have not edited the data.
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Table 3.4: Regression Analysis for All Three Generations
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time (birth year - 1852) 0.124 0.131 0.119 0.127 0.137 0.149
(0.001) (.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Grew up in rural Area -3.340 -1.343 -3.139 -1.350 -1.045 1.489
(0.045) (0.083) (0.066) (0.083) (0.290) (0.287)
Female -1.690 -1.773 -2.365 -2.506 -6.137 -5.809
(0.030) (0.027) (0.146) (0.110) (0.356) (0.327)
Female*time 0.010 0.007 0.049 0.046
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Female*rural 3.907 3.747
(0.379) (0.347)
Rural*time -0.020 -0.024
(0.003) (0.003)
Female*rural*time -0.045 -0.043
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant -3.428 -3.037 -4.893
(0.076) (0.109) (0.272)
Observations 58,362 58,362 58,362
Mean of Dep Variable 5.13 5.13 5.13
R-squared 0.50 0.67 0.50 0.68 0.51 0.68
Unsurprisingly, each of these factors has a significant effect on schooling and even with
this most parsimonious specification, the R2 is 0.50. Each additional year corresponds to a
gain of 0.12 years of schooling, or 1.2 years per decade. We also see a large negative effect
for a rural hukou, associated with a reduction of 3.3 years in expected education. Females
too are worse off, with 1.7 fewer years on average.
Because we have multiple observations per family, we can control for unobserved family
fixed effects. These could represent family values regarding education, resources to finance
an education, or potentially measures of the difficulty of accessing schooling in the particular
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family’s locale. Specifically, we allow the error term in the regression specification to have a
family fixed effect in addition to the individual component so that the error term is εij + uj.
The results of this fixed effects specification, reported in column (2), are similar to those in
column (1). An additional year of time is associated with 0.13 more years of schooling, and
women have 1.8 years fewer years of schooling than men. The effect of living in a rural area
is mitigated when we control for family effects. This variable is identified using of families
in which there is a generational shift in region.
Expanding on our list of control variables, in columns (3) and (4) we include an interaction
of female with time to assess the extent to which the disadvantage women have in terms
of schooling has being declining over time. With the inclusion of this interaction term, the
linear effect of time is similar to that in the original specification at 1.2 years of schooling
per decade, as is the coefficient on rural status. There is a slightly larger negative effect of
being female as measured at time zero, but the interaction term means that this negative
effect declines over time at the rate of 0.1 years per decade—an extremely modest gain for
women.
The final two columns add interactions between female and rural, rural and time, and
female, rural and time. These regressors allow for varying gains for women in rural relative to
urban areas, different time trends for the two regions, and differing time trends for rural and
urban areas more generally. As in the prior specifications, all coefficients are significantly
different from zero. Time continues to have a similar effect as in column (1), with the
coefficient increasing only slightly to 1.4 years of additional schooling per decade. With the
addition of the interaction terms, the linear effect of a rural hukou is much larger in absolute
value than it was previously, and its negative impact increases slowly over time at a rate of
0.2 years per decade. For women with a rural hukou, the negative effect of a rural hukou at
time zero disappears, likely simply because the years of schooling that long ago were near
zero in rural areas for all, so that there is little difference for men and women. However,
the three way interaction (female*rural*time) points to a decline in the relative position of
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women in rural areas relative to men and relative to women in urban areas.
3.4.2 Policy Factors
To focus on our policy variables, we limit our sample to observations for the youngest cohort
because they are of the age that they would have potentially been impacted by the changing
policies. In table 3.5 we first replicate the results of table 3.4 for the single cohort to assess
whether the standard set of regressors impact years of schooling differently for this cohort.
In columns (5) through (8) we then add regressors to examine the effect of the two policy
interventions on years of schooling.
In the simplest specification, column (1), the estimated effects are surprisingly similar to
those shown in the first column of table 3.4. An additional year for this cohort is associated
with a 0.14 gain in schooling, slightly larger but comparable to the 0.124 value in table
3.4. The effect of a rural hukou, while similar to that previously reported, is now larger in
absolute value. This result stems from the rising levels of education overall; as schooling
levels rise at similar rates overall, the difference between rural and urban measured in levels
becomes larger. There is, however, a much larger change for the female dummy variable
relative to table 3.4; for this youngest cohort, women can expect only 0.9 fewer years of
schooling relative to men compared to the 1.7 years when estimated over all cohorts.
Column (3) adds the interaction of female with time. The estimated effect is much larger
(nearly seven times greater) than in the parallel specification in table 3.4, pointing to the
recent relative gains in female educational levels in China. As with table 3.4, the fixed effects
specifications do not reveal any substantial differences.
The remaining columns in table 3.5 include measures of our policy changes, add parental
schooling measures, and further interactions.18 To examine the effect of the one child policy,
we add an indicator for the child being an only child (we do not have this information for the
older cohorts) as well as measures for the degree to which the child’s mother was impacted
18We cannot include parental schooling in table 3.4 because we have no such measures for the oldest
cohort.
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Table 3.5: Regression Analysis for All Three Generations
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time (birth year – 1852) 0.140 0.081 0.101 0.049 0.029 0.039 0.036 0.042
(0.003) (.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Grew up in Rural Area -4.263 -1.386 -4.257 -1.346 -2.613 -1.385 -2.365 -0.977
(0.076) (0.005) (0.076) (0.190) (0.079) (0.193) (0.124) (0.226)
Female -0.910 -1.226 -9.369 -9.598 -9.963 -9.695 -7.191 -8.453
(0.052) (0.046) (0.678) (0.595) (0.638) (0.602) (1.069) (1.003)
Female*Time 0.068 0.068 0.073 0.069 0.055 0.063
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Only child 1.097 – 1.273 –
(0.121) – (0.148) –
One child policy 0.645 – 0.427 –
(0.106) – (0.141) –
Compulsory schooling 0.352 0.305 -0.159 0.332
(0.085) (0.096) (0.214) (0.308)
Father’s yrs of school 0.253 – 0.229 –
(0.007) – (0.010) –
Mother’s yrs of school 0.222 – 0.181 –
(0.008) – (0.011) –
Female*comp school -0.939 -0.841
(0.320) (0.356)
Female*one child policy 0.502 –
(0.207) –
Rural*comp school 0.577 -0.090
(0.281) (0.366)
Rural*one child policy 0.079 0.148
(0.207) (0.216)
Female*rural -1.427 -1.203
(0.183) (0.175)
Female*rural*comp sch 0.919 1.209
(0.418) (0.444)
Female*rural*one child pol 0.040
(0.304)
Female*rural*only child 0.387
(0.413)
Female*only child 0.101 –
(0.326) –
Female*father’s school 0.043 0.036
(0.015) (0.014)
Female*mother’s school 0.082 0.101
(0.016) (0.015)
Constant -4.709 -0.726 6.845 – 4.199
(0.344) (0.468) (0.617) – (0.733)
Observations 23,473 23,473 23,473 23,473
Mean of Dep Variable 8.54 8.54 8.54 8.54
R-squared 0.20 0.73 0.21 0.74 0.30 0.74 0.31 0.74
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by the one child policy during her child bearing years (denoted here with the label "one child
policy"). In column (7) and column (8), we add variables delineating whether the child was
subject to compulsory schooling laws, the educational levels of the child’s father and mother,
and numerous interactions with gender and rural hukou.
Beginning in column (5) we note first that the specification is well identified; all coeffi-
cients are significantly different from zero. With the addition of policy variables and parental
education, the time trend decreases substantially to just 0.29 years per decade. This value
pertains to males as the effect for females is the sum of this coefficient and the interaction
female*time (0.029 + 0.073 = 0.102). Other variables have similar effects to those in the
prior specifications. Among the newly added variables, being an only child is associated
with over one year of additional education, a substantial increase. With a mean education
level of 8.54 years, this represents a 13 percent increase and is roughly equivalent to the gain
experienced by women over a decade of time.
The one child policy adds to this only child effect with an additional 0.65 years of school-
ing, as does the compulsory schooling law which is associated with 0.35 years of schooling.
Both father’s schooling and mother’s schooling levels have positive and significant effects
on the child’s schooling attainment that are similar in magnitude. An additional year of
education for the child’s father is associated with 0.25 additional years for the child, while
an additional year of mother’s education is associated with 0.22 years. Compared to a child
whose father has a middle school education, a child whose father graduated from high school
would be expected to have 0.25*3 or 0.75 additional years of schooling. This effect could
come directly from the value more educated parents place on schooling, the accessibility of
schooling in the locale, or could serve as a proxy for financial resources of the family.19
When turning to a fixed effects specification (column (6)) we are unable to identify those
regressors that do not vary within family. Because "family" in this one-generation specifi-
cation is just siblings, several variables are constant within family, namely only child, the
19While we have good measures of family income, they pertain to 2011 or 2013 when the interviews were
conducted, not to the time at which children were enrolled or considering enrolling in school.
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one child policy measure that is based on the mother’s age and location, and the years of
schooling attained by the father and mother. The compulsory schooling variable is identi-
fied because children were born in different years and thus faced different regimes, although
we recognize that there could be "spillover effects" if parents endeavor to ensure the same
schooling for all siblings. The estimated effect of compulsory schooling is statistically indis-
tinguishable from that in the OLS specification, as are other variables with the exception of
rural hukou which again changes significantly in the fixed effects version.
In the final pair of columns we add interaction terms allowing compulsory schooling laws,
the one child policy, and parental education to vary across urban and rural areas and by the
gender of the child. With the large number of interactions, the net effects are often difficult
to discern with a passing glance. Here we focus on relative rather than absolute comparisons.
Focusing on these linear and interaction terms, being an only child continues to have a
large, positive and significant effect on schooling, as does the one child policy. However, the
linear term for compulsory schooling is not significantly different from zero and in fact, the
standard error is larger than the coefficient. Regarding interactions with "female," being the
only child has a significantly larger effect for daughters, suggesting that competition and
tighter financial constraints matter more for the schooling of girls. Perhaps surprisingly, the
one child policy does not appear to favor girls over boys; the linear effect is positive and
significant but the interaction with female is not significantly different from zero. (The point
estimate is 0.50 with a standard error of 0.2.) Schooling of parents continues to be more
important, but echoing the results in table 3, the relationship is significantly stronger for
daughters than sons. An additional year of education for one’s father is associated with 0.23
years of additional schooling for a son and 0.23 + 0.043 = 0.273 for a daughter. If schooling
is a proxy for the family’s financial means, this result would indicate the income elasticity
of schooling is greater for daughters than sons. Interestingly, an additional year of schooling
for a mother implies 0.18 years of additional schooling for a son, but 0.18 + 0.082 = 0.262
for a daughter. Thus, while the effect of either parent’s education is stronger for daughters
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than sons, the additional effect of a mother’s education for daughters is greater than the
additional effect of a father’s perhaps pointing to the greater bargaining position of more
educated wives.
As expected, children in rural areas are worse off, and the penalty is larger for girls.
While the linear term for compulsory schooling is itself not significantly different from zero,
compulsory schooling does have a large effect in rural areas of just over one-half of a year of
schooling (significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level). And this positive effect
is substantially larger still for girls in rural areas, associated with an additional year of
education.
When looking at the fixed effects specification, the results are all similar to the OLS
specification with the exception of the effect of the mother’s schooling for daughters which
increases while that for father’s schooling decreases.
As these results demonstrate, public policy can have important effects on schooling at-
tainment as well as on male/female and rural/urban differences in this measure. We note
that the gains in education observed here come not just from policies that directly target
education, such as compulsory schooling laws, but from policies such as the one child policy
that have indirect effects. Depending on the specification, the one child policy and compul-
sory schooling have effects that are far larger than simply economic growth as proxied by a
time trend.
3.5 Conclusion
The rise in economic growth and educational attainment experienced in China over the
last several decades has been stunning and have been shared across demographic groups
improving outcomes for both men and women and those in rural and urban areas. Further,
the gains experienced, particularly by women, resulted in a reduction in the large disparity
initially existing between schooling levels of men and women. In fact, we find that women
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now have more average years of schooling than do men. Gains in rural areas, while substantial
still leave individuals in these areas far behind their urban counterparts.
In this paper we examine the effect on schooling of two important policy changes—the
institution of nine years compulsory schooling and the one child policy. Our study differs
from past work in that we can examine differences within families and across generations of
the same family. We find that the effects of compulsory schooling were large and significant
only in rural areas and were largest for rural women. This result is not surprising as schooling
in urban areas was already typically higher than that mandated by the policy. In contrast,
the one child policy, which was instituted nationwide but which was more strictly enforced
in urban areas, had nearly equal positive effects on schooling for men and women and for
rural and urban areas. These results point more generally to the importance of policy as
well as general economic growth in driving schooling attainment.
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Appendix
Table 3.6: Assigned years of schooling based on education level
Education level Assigned Years of
Schooling
No formal education (illiterate) 0
Did not finish primary school but capable of reading or writing 2
Sishu/home school 2
Graduate from elementary school 6
Graduate from middle school 9
Graduate from high school 12
Graduate from vocational school 14.5
Graduate from Two/Three Year College/Associate degree 14.5
Graduate from Four Year College/Bachelor’s degree 16
Graduate from Post-graduate, Master’s degree 18
Graduate from Post-graduate, Doctoral degree/Ph.D. 21
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